"Miracles can not, do not and will not happen"

It is a difficult position indeed to suggest that miracles are impossible, and few theologians have adopted it. Hume came dangerously close to suggesting it with his arguments against miracles, but even he, most famous perhaps of all empiricists, stopped short of labelling them impossible, proposing rather that they were exceedingly unlikely. However, it is a tenable position to accept that miracles can happen, but that they have not ever happened in the past, and do not happen on a daily basis. With particular reference to the latter, this tends to be the position adopted by the fundamentally non-Christian public.

It is of course necessary to define the meaning of the word "miracle" itself, as it is frequently used in senses that do not constitute a true miracle. Hume defined it as "a transgression of a law of nature by a particular volition of the Deity, or by the interposition of some invisible agent" and Woolston had enunciated a similar view of the common notion of the miraculous: "A Miracle, if I mistake not the Notion of our Divines about it, is a supernatural Event, or a Work out of the Power of Nature or Art to effect." However, in a post-Newtonian age, this definition really does not hold. Hume lived in the Age of the Enlightenment, when it seemed for the first time as if the entire world was run in a mechanistic way, and thus an understandable intellectual complacency entered his work; an attitude that one day, man will know all the answers, and these "miracles" will be explained away. Hume’s definition is therefore widely considered to be inaccurate, too narrow and detrimental to the facilitation of discussion on the issue. Brian Davies suggests that a much wider definition is now necessary – miracles are "unexpected and fortuitous events in the light of which we are disposed to give thanks to God." The inclusion of the word "fortuitous" implies that the event could not be the direct intervention of God, but merely is perceived by believers as being so. As such, this definition of a miracle again seems a little weak, as it could simply apply to any religious experience, rather than a miracle. A miracle, if it is indeed a miracle, must directly imply the intervention of God – either directly or indirectly – in worldly affairs and thus Davies’ definition is not explicit enough.

Macquarrie suggested that there are four different categories of miracle:

  1. The improvement of a person (in a non-physical sense)
  2. God working through people to perform good.
  3. A momentous occurrence, which could theoretically be explained by natural phenomena.
  4. A momentous occurrence, which can only be explained by the existence of God.

There are inherent weaknesses with this elaboration as well – namely, that points one and two can never be proved to a disbeliever to have been linked with God in any way, and to the sceptic merely seem to be a tired assertion that, without God, there can be no good. Judeo-Christian faiths have not taken this line (the Talmud specifies that a man can be good without being a believer) and thus points one and two are open to criticism. Similarly, point four leads to a worrying "God of the Gaps" theory – namely, that if we cannot explain a phenomenon, we may attribute it to God, even though it will be explained scientifically at a later date. As Allen expresses: "Those things in nature which we do understand are not miraculous to us, and those things which we do not understand, we cannot with any propriety adjudge to be miraculous." As the Catholic Church rigorously attempts to avoid this, it seems that we must be wary here too. However, it is perfectly possible that miracles do occur on a small scale as outlined in points one and two, and perfectly possible that miracles occur which cannot, and will not, be explained without the existence and action of some Higher Being, thus we cannot rule them out from the list of types of miracles.

At this point, it must be noted that the "laser-beam God" [David Jenkins] must be avoided – if God merely zaps in and out of worldly affairs occasionally, then hides himself until His next miracle, then this does not fit in with the definition of God as the sum of all perfections, because he appears neither personal nor loving. Thus, although miracles must imply God at work on Earth, we must be careful – how can the fact that God did not stop the Holocaust be reconciled with the claims that St. Gennaro’s blood spontaneously liquefies? Claims of miracles must be treated with great scepticism and undergo thorough examination, because, as Hume points out, it is always more likely that they did not happen than that they did.

The question of whether miracles can happen or not is one with a remarkably short answer – they can. This is merely an exercise in pure logic:

  • It is possible for God to exist.
  • If God exists, He is omnipotent.
  • If God is omnipotent, he can bring miracles about.
  • Therefore, as God might exist, miracles can theoretically occur.

Despite this, there have been many arguments against the possibility of miracles – I will not cite Hume’s arguments as one, as he never claims that they are impossible (he shall come later, examining whether miracles do occur or not), but an American deist, Allen. Is argument runs as follows, and is again a matter of logic:

  • God is Perfect.
  • The Laws of Nature were established by God.
  • The Laws of Nature are therefore perfect.

  • Miracles require an alteration of the Laws of Nature.
  • The alteration of the Law of Nature must be imperfect.

Which presents a logical dichotomy. The other fork of his argument runs:

  • Miracles require the alteration of the Laws of Nature.
  • The alteration of the Law of Nature has bettered it.
  • The Laws of Nature were not perfect in their eternal establishment

These are very compelling arguments, and, if all of the premises are sound, then it certainly is true that miracles are logically impossible. However, there is a severe problem with the premises. Allen claims that miracles are an alteration of a Law of Nature. Considering the first two types of miracles, this is not the case, and in the case if the other two types, it is possible that the system of Nature set in motion by God has been designed with the possibility of miracles "built-in". In this case, miracles are not a violation of a Law of Nature.

There is a very powerful argument against the occurrence of miracles, propounded ironically by Macquarrie, but with great stength. It runs to the effect that God is not a particular being, but Being itself. Particular beings, such as people, guns, helicopters and DNA have effects, but God does not, as He is Being. He has no particular effects in this world, because He is not a being, but the essence of Being. This existential concept of God as Being does open itself to the possibility of miracles, as, if God is the essence of existence, He may theoretically dictate everything that occurs within our world. It thus stands that miracles may occur.

Whether they do or not, however, is a contentious issue. Many of the American Deists of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries held that miracles had not occurred, did not occur and will not occur. Certainly it is no longer necessary for a Christian to believe in the occurrence of miracles. In the early days of Christianity, Origen stated that "The Gospel has a demonstration of its own … because of the signs and wonders which we must believe to have been performed … that traces of them are still preserved among those who regulate their lives by the precepts of the Gospel." Clearly for him, miracles were an important part of Christian faith, but Christians have never maintained that Jesus performed miracles, therefore he was the Son of God – if he had not performed any miracles, it would have damaged his case, but Moses and other prominent religious figureheads also performed miracles. Macquarrie has argued that a belief in miracles in necessary for a belief in a personal God. He does this on the grounds that, if God has no particular effect within the world (the ironic argument he proposed above), then there is no purpose to prayer, and there is no real sense to faith and religious experience. Essentially, if God does not intervene in worldly affairs, why worship Him, why believe in Him and why love Him? The God of deism seems impersonal, cold and unloving – hardly in keeping with the Christian depiction of God dying for our sins out of Love for the world. Despite this, deism is not untenable as a stance, and it is possible to accept Christianity without accepting miracles.

The arguments against the occurrence of miracles are most prominently levelled by those 18th-19th century deists. For Allen, there could not possibly be any "evidence of a miracle" unless we fully understood the relevant natural laws governing the particular phenomena at issue and we had "certain knowledge" that those laws had been "suspended … [and] superseded by new ones." Once again, this criticism must be placed in the temporal context in which he wrote – his was a direct response to the God of the Gaps, and it does stand as a timely reminder. However, just because we do not comprehend the natural laws governing a situation does not mean that a miracle did not occur, thus his argument, although it points out that, where we understand less, miracles must be treated with greater scepticism, does not stand as a whole. Hume’s arguments, likewise, merely express that, in a situation where a miracle may have occurred, it is more likely that it has not, because:

  1. There rarely enough witnesses for a miracle to seem likely, and even when there are, they are rarely of sufficiently high intelligence.
  2. People have a natural urge to search for the magnificent, particularly clergy.
  3. Miracles are most commonly reported in barbarous nations.
  4. Miracles are reported by many religions, but the reports are so different in style and character that they appear to cancel each other out.

Points three and four are clearly invalid: many people are healed miraculously at Lourds even today, and there are many similarities in miraculous reports – for example, most religions have a story about a great flood and in many religions a divine messenger converses with a human to explain the intention of God. However, points one and two, although arrogant, contain great worth. If we were to conduct a rigorous investigation into a miracle, and the Catholic Church does so with each report, then the testimony of witnesses would have to be incredibly similar, there were would have to be many witnesses, their intellect would probably be considered, and the fact that people do search for the sublime where there is only the mundane would have to be considered. Hume’s argument does not prove by any means that miracles can not have happened, but he does demonstrate that we must treat miracles sceptically and that it is more likely that no miracle occurred than that one did. This stands to reason – if miracles occurred more often than not, then they would not be deemed miracles by any of the definitions available!

Inherent in any question about miracles must be a brief examination of past miracles and an evaluation of their criteria – the resurrection of Lazarus, for example. If Lazarus has died and his soul has moved on to a higher and happier plane of existence, why make him suffer in this world by bringing him back to life? And why resurrect him rather than others? Equally, why does John never mention any exorcism of demons, whereas the other gospels are filled with references to such exorcisms? How many people bore witness to the resurrection of Christ – just the apostles and two women – and how sound are the reports of their testimonies, which are in fact reports of reports of reports (ad infinitum), because stories were related rather than recorded, and thus the potential for exaggeration is great. It seems that most miracles cannot really be construed as more likely than the alternative and that, although we cannot know divine purpose, many miracles are and were illogical.

The unbeliever may naturally pounce on the situation at this point and make reference to the fact that miracles could merely be inventions designed to induce belief, or to explain phenomena that were not understood. This cynical outlook is not really fair: "in the age of the electric light-bulb" – an age of questioning and good education – people have not stopped believing in miracles, although they now understand many of the forces at work in our world. It is not the case either that people have merely clung to miracles – the Catholic Church is rigorous in its examination of reported miracles. The unbeliever may make a fair case against the first two types of miracle though – it is entirely possible for these "miracles" to be psychosomatic or merely the result of entirely natural phenomena, and there is little a believer can reply to this claim except to say that he believes that they are not. There is thus great justification behind the claim that miracles are less likely to occur than they are likely to, and even when it appears that "miracles" have occurred, they are frequently not miracles at all, but the product of natural phenomena.

None of this rules out the fact that miracles may occur. Personally, I have great difficulty reconciling myself to this though – nor because it is less likely that they have occurred than that they have, but because it seems ridiculous to claim that miracles have occurred on such insignificant levels as the saving of a baby from death when great evils in the world are allowed to occur. How can a loving God allow the holocaust but save one person’s life? Of course the American TV evangelists have done little to heighten the credibility of miracles on a daily basis, but we must not be prejudiced because of this – these shows did not invent the concept of miracles; they merely live off them. However, it still seems impossible to reconcile oneself to the idea that miracles do occur or have occurred when such things as the holocaust are allowed to happen. This dichotomy, coupled with the paradox that, if God intervenes in worldly affairs, it almost by necessity interferes with our free will, means that I find it almost impossible to accept that miracles do happen or will happen. Nevertheless, I will not rule out the fact that they may happen in the future, because it is logically possible for miracles to occur.

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