The problem of evil, first formulated by Epicurus (320-270 BC), presents the largest challenge to the existence of God. Hume, over two millennia later, described it as "the rock of atheism," and this description is accurate – the existence of evil lays the solid foundations upon which a vigorous atheistic stance may be constructed. In its initial formulation, the Inconsistent Triad [Epicurus], a series of questions are posed, and the 20^th century catholic theologian, P. Clarke, paraphrases these as: "Is God willing but not able to prevent evil? Then He is impotent. Is He able but not willing? Then He is malevolent. Is he both able and willing? Whence then is evil?" This neatly lays down the problem that many theologians have attempted to overcome – that either God is not omnipotent, or He is not benevolent, or evil does not exist.

Before progressing further, "evil" must be clarified. For the purposes of Epicurus, "evil" referred primarily to anything bad which occurred within the world, and this definition has been handed down through the ages, resulting in that old chestnut: "Why does God allow people doing a good turn to get hurt?" [Atkinson]. Natural disasters, illness, accidents, torture and genocide are grouped together under the umbrella-term "evil." However, this definition proves unwieldy when dealing with Augustinian theodicy, and so, for the purposes of this essay, "evil" shall be subdivided into two categories – moral evils, being the product of a malevolent human will; and non-moral evils, being the product of natural forces or accidents. However, this does not actually define the term "evil", and this is perhaps necessary. "Evil" for the theist must mean bad from the perspective of God, whereas for the atheist it must mean bad from the perspective of humanity (unless the atheist holds a Neo-Platonic view of reality). These two definitions might appear to be at odds, until one begins to examine specific examples of situations described as "evil" – few would argue that pre-meditated murder for no purpose (other than the sadistic tendency of the murderer) is ever good. This being the case, it appears that there is no need to outline a definition of evil as evil is at least in some way intuitive to people. Essentially, everyone understands what is meant by the term "evil", and to define it would simply limit its application and the debate surrounding it.

Leibniz first used the term "theodicy", defining it as the attempt to justify the existence of evil whilst preserving our notions of God’s providence. However, before studying theodicy, one might wish to deny the very existence of evil and, this being the case, there would be no need to justify its existence. Mary Baker Eddy, founder of the Christian Scientists, attempted just that, maintaining that suffering and evil are merely illusory forces within the mind. She believed that, if people make a mental effort, they would see that evil does not exist as a reality in itself. Immediately one might reply that this notion would offer scant comfort to the victims of the Holocaust, but this does not destroy the notion in any way. In fact, upon examining Platonic and Kantian teachings upon the difference between observation and reality, it appears entirely possible that evil is merely a phenomenon, not a noumenon – it does not exist in any real sense; rather our minds interpret reality in such a way that evil appears to exist. This being the case, however, one must accept that good is, in the same way and by the same logic, possibly merely illusory and that, if people merely made the mental effort, then they would see that good is not a noumenon. Moral relativists might take this stance – good and evil are terms used by societies to express approval or disapproval – and it is consistent and coherent to maintain that good and evil do not exist in themselves. However, it is not a position in keeping with the notion that God is the source of all God within the world, and thus, one must accept that to deny the existence of evil whilst believing in God is an irrational position to hold.

One must thus accept that evil exists, if one is to reconcile its existence to God’s. Before attempting this, however, the notion of cosmic Dualism must be studied. This is not the traditional Theistic interpretation of metaphysical reality, but has been held, most notably by Zoroastrianism and, some might argue (because of frequent references to Satan) Christianity. The concept is that there are two powers, one good and one evil, who are locked in an eternal cosmic battle. Evil is a product of the evil power, good a product of the good power, and thus there is no need to reconcile evil to the existence of the good power. However, this is not a hopeful philosophy, as it makes no promise that the good power will win and believers are faced with the constant fear that evil might triumph! It also implies that the good power is not omnipotent, thus neglecting one element of theodicy – that of preserving God’s omnipotence. Although the position is consistent and coherent with reality as we know it, for the reasons mentioned, it has no longer the position of most believers, and is not itself strictly theistic. Thus, if we are to look for a position of theism consistent with evil, we must look elsewhere.

This search within the Church has broadly taken three pathways: Irenaean, Augustinian and Leibnizian theodicy. Dealing with the latter first, Leibniz held that the universe was created in the best possible way to fulfil God’s purpose. We are all, in some way, a tool for God – most likely, a product of His mind, say – and although we cannot understand God’s purpose, we are busy fulfilling it as we speak. Leibniz held the position parodied by Voltaire in Candide (Dr Pangloss being Leibniz) that "this is the best of all possible worlds, and everything is as it should be." This attempt to justify evil makes God almost a moral monstrosity, as He is using people as tools, not treating them as ends in themselves, but as means (contradictory to Kant’s maxims on how we should live our life). It is also hopelessly theoretical to claim that we are in some way fulfilling a purpose that we cannot understand, and this position has no rational basis. It is impossible to argue against it, but logical positivism might be usefully employed here – the statement that we are fulfilling God’s purpose actually has no meaning at all, as it is consistent with all possibilities and can neither be verified nor falsified. There is also a severe logical flaw in suggesting that God needs flawed humans to fulfil His divine purpose, and the implication of determinism. This is ultimately then unsatisfactory.

St. Augustine’s (354-430) theodicy was based upon the Fall as explained in Genesis 3. He borrowed theodicy from St. Paul to explain that non-moral and moral evil first entered the world through the disobedience of our first parents, Adam and Eve. This brought about a disorder in nature and a disorder in the creation, and thus the existence of evil is not God’s fault but man’s. In this formulation, however, God has played at least some part in mankind’s Fall from grace – if God created beings that He knew would sin, then He is not wholly blameless for the existence of evil. It is also the case, on a scientific level, that evil existed before mankind and that there was no Golden Age – the brutality of the Cro-Magnon (ancestors to Homo sapiens) pays testimony to this. Augustine’s theodicy, in its original formulation, does not stand up to the test of time. However, one might develop his reference to evil entering the world through the decisions of people, known as the "free will" defence. God, having created mankind as beings able to freely choose their actions, has created beings with the capability of sinning. As such, evil is a product of God’s gift to mankind, but is not God’s fault – after all, would there be any worth whatsoever to life if we did not have the ability to make moral decisions? However, this defence does not stand up to systematic trial. Firstly, it makes no attempt to justify the existence of non-moral evils – unless one accepts Augustine’s notion of the Fall, there is no way that men can be blamed for earthquakes. Secondly, if God is omniscient, then can He be excused from acting in order to prevent our actions and can He be excused from the consequences of His creation if he knew how they would act? Lastly one must remember the traditional Christian notion of retribution for bad actions (either Hell or purgatory) – ultimately, if God has given us free will, but will punish evil actions, then the free will defence runs as follows: "You are all free to act in whatever way you want, but if you don’t act in the way that I want, you will be punished." This theodicy does not reconcile God’s omniscience to his benevolence, and thus is no theodicy at all. However, one must accept that a lot of evil within the world empirically is the product of human decision – murder is not the product of a natural process, unless one has a determinist notion of reality – and thus the free will defence does work in some way towards justifying moral evils, if not non-moral ones. If one then adopts the notion of God as laid down in process theology – constantly within our world and beckoning to us, with good eventually proving victorious – then the earlier points about punishment and omniscience may be ignored. The free will defence does go some way then towards justifying moral evils.

Irenaean theodicy preceded Augustinian theodicy by about 250 years, yet stood up to the trial of evolution much better. Indeed, both Hick (in The God of Love) and Swinburne (in The Existence of God) have recently revived Irenaeus’ teachings. Irenaeus saw the world as "a vale of soul-making," i.e. man was made in God’s image, but man’s aim is to grow into God’s likeness. For this "improvement" of humanity, people must be tested and challenged. Adam and Eve were at an immature stage of development when the Fall occurred, and since then, humanity as whole has developed and become more moral. This interpretation allows for growth and development on a personal and social level, and is, in a way, an adaptation of "cometh the hour, cometh the man" – people expand to the situation’s requirements. One might steal ideas from Nietzsche, quoting his theories of the Übermensch (although with a very different notion of what that Übermensch would be): "man is a rope, tied between beast and the Übermensch, a rope over the abyss … what is great about man is that he is a bridge and not an end in himself. … What is the ape to man? A laughing stock or a painful embarrassment." Evil then exists in order to test us and improve us. However, Irenaeus (and his recent supporters) would be unable to explain why people who have suffered often become embittered and dehumanised by that suffering. They would also be unable to explain why evil occurs so randomly – surely it is not the case that those who suffer most are those who need the most improvement. It is also an overly optimistic philosophy, and suffers from all of the problems of a teleological interpretation of history. To claim that everything so far has been working to a point, and will continue working to that point until that is achieved (i.e. when man comes of age and the Kingdom of God is realised), neglects some of the glitches on the graph of moral improvement. The Holocaust was almost certainly more barbarous than events of 10000 years past, and to claim that the victims were "useful" (as Swinburne did) in proposing a moral problem to the guards is patently ridiculous, offensive and insulting. As a result then, Irenaeus’ theodicy is not a satisfactory explanation of moral evils. However, it might function effectively for non-moral evil: without bad things happening, people would be unlikely to develop the qualities of love, friendship and compassion. Non-moral evil is therefore perhaps necessary for moral good to exist.

It seems then possible that, even within the confines of human intellect, the existence of evil might theoretically be reconciled to the existence of God, using Augustinian theodicy with moral evils and Irenaean theodicy with non-moral evils. However, I should like to take the developments of Irenaeus further, and explain the necessity of evil, not for the development of humanity, but for the existence of good. A world without the potential for bad things would similarly not have the potential for good things, as something cannot exist of itself without the possibility of the existence of its opposite. For example, if I were to walk up to a man and punch him, yet that punch would not cause him pain (owing to the physics of this hypothetical world) then that would not be an evil action. In fact, everything I ever did could only have neutral or good (from our perspective) consequences. This would then redefine the scales, as good and bad from our perspective are merely relative to the best and worst of our experiences. So a morally neutral action (from our perspective) would be an evil action (from the new perspective), and the scales would simply be reset. This being the case, evil must at least potentially exist for good to exist, i.e. we must have the capability of performing actions which are less than fully good for good to mean anything to us. This theodicy reconciles moral evils in the following way:

• Our actions must at least potentially be able to cause evil, for us to have free will.
• Our good or bad actions must not be punished or rewarded, as that would negate our free will – if a gun is held to a man’s head in what sense is he truly free? Similarly, if a man is threatened with hell for his sins, in what way is he free?
• Without freedom of will, life is meaningless. Therefore, for our lives to have any meaning, we must have the capacity for evil.
• This world thus requires the existence of potential evils.
• Given that potential for evil exists, it follows that, of 6 billion people, some will realise this potential. It further follows that, humans being immensely complex and faced with frequent decisions, they will all commit some evil actions at some point.
• It also follows that, as moral evil is the product of free will, moral evils will not be evenly distributed.

Moral evils thus serve no purpose, but must at least potentially exist for moral goods to exist. This theodicy also serves to explain non-moral evils. Bad things must occur in order for us to appreciate good things. So for example, mortality is necessary for us to appreciate the value of this life. Some foods must taste horrible for us to appreciate the nice-tasting ones.

This position ultimately satisfies me – the potential for moral evil is necessary for us to appreciate the reality of good, and it is only natural that the potential will be realised at points, owing to the experimental and curious nature of humans. It is also necessary for non-moral evils things to happen sometimes, not merely potentially occur, in order for us to remember our values. However, some have denied the necessity for a coherent theory of theodicy within this lifetime. Hick speaks at length of the value of eschatological verification – when we die, we will look back upon our lives and realise the purpose and function of evil. Just as the back of a tapestry looks chaotic, belying the front’s beauty, so our lives look chaotic and confusing now, but their true nature will be revealed. In this way, the problem of evil would eventually be overcome and reconciled to theism. However, it is once again a position for which the logical positivist might well have problems, as there is no way of arguing about it reasonably – either you believe it or you don’t, and you cannot have a reason for that belief, merely a blik. Worse than that, it is entirely circular. Eschatology assumes the existence of God, then works back to say that evil will be explained when we meet the God that we have already assumed exists. This is not a helpful argument.

My conclusion is that the problems of evil can be overcome, and that one can believe in God and the existence of evil without sacrificing God’s omnipotence or benevolence. As explained earlier, the potential for moral evil must exist, as must the reality of non-moral evil, in order for us to value anything at all within this world. It is unfortunate that evil is not spread evenly throughout the world, such that no one suffers too much, but ultimately, if everyone suffered the same amount, that would destroy part of the nature of the value system. If you knew just how much you would suffer and enjoy within this life, you would cease to value things, because the randomness of the potential for evil would have effectively evaporated, and thus evil and good would again become totally meaningless suppositions. Some would disagree with this, the most powerful statement coming from Jurgen Moltmann who maintained in The Crucified God (1974) that "when tens of thousands die a senseless death, all theodicy turns to lies." Moltmann instead turns to a process theology, interpreting God as a God who shares in our suffering. This is not fully satisfactory, as evil still exists, and the senseless death of tens of thousands might place a great burden upon theodicy, but it does not make it false or unhelpful. Moral and non-moral evils must exist in potential, and so do exist in reality, in order for moral and non-moral goods to exist. There must be the potential for tens of thousands to die senselessly in order for us to value life. Indeed, sufferers from terminal illnesses often reconcile themselves to their mortality and begin to value life for what it is and what it has been, often for the first time in their lives.

I would ask people who challenge the existence of God, on the grounds of the existence of evil, to ask themselves one question: would they rather be a rock or a person? Would they rather be unable to experience good or evil in any form, or would they rather have the possibility of experiencing tremendous pleasure, yet also tremendous pain? Almost no one would chose to be the rock – those who do ought to commit suicide, logically – and thus there is a tacit acceptance amongst humans who have not killed themselves that it is, paradoxically, better for evil to exist than for it not to.