The Mt Mulligan Branch Railway
See The Mount Mulligan Branch, by Rod Milne in Australian Railway History for December 2004 p 467
This paper is presented to serve two purposes: to correct the above article as published, and to be as complete a history as possible of the line, a correction of the Milne article in the widest sense.
There are many errors and many important omissions in this alleged history of the Mt Mulligan branch. Indeed, there is little real history. There is no evidence that even obvious sources of history were consulted. There is a lot of surmising, about things which the author did not know. Most of this surmising does not fit the facts which are known. There is also a lot of padding. The author simply made up things to fill out his story, for a story it largely is, not history.
Sources I consulted are given at the end. There is considerable documented history of the place and the mine, and material which allows the history of the branch to be filled out.
Miles are used in most cases for distances. One mile (which contains 80 chains) equals 1.62 kms. One mile contains 80 chains and one chain is approx 20 metres. Tons are used for weight. A ton is 1.016 tonnes.
Genesis
Three coal seams, discovered in 1907, outcrop on the red escarpment of Mt Mulligan, some 60 miles or 95 kms almost due west of Cairns. Mt Mulligan was 12 miles north of Thornborough, headquarters of the declining Hodgkinson gold field (see below).
The smelters at Chillagoe and Irvinebank, 93 and 68 rail miles away respectively, were fuelled by local firewood, and coal and coke obtained from Southern Queensland and Newcastle NSW. In that very year, 7179 tons of coke were imported into Cairns for Chillagoe and Irvinebank.
John Moffat obtained the mining and prospecting rights of the coal bearing areas at Mt Mulligan, but did only a little development work. The Chillagoe Company had great interest in a coal deposit close to its operations. That was especially important when the price of copper fell in 1907. In 1910, it used 40,000 tons of firewood and imported 10,600 tons of coke and 10,000 of coal through Cairns. In 1911, that company surveyed a branch railway to Mt Mulligan from Dimbulah, on its own railway from Mareeba to Mungana. In 1912, it obtained the right from Moffat to develop the coal deposit on a royalty basis. In that year, the Government Geologist reported that that the coal in at least one seam at Mt Mulligan was suited to coking.
The Chillagoe Company claimed to be unable to finance this branch, and in 1911 asked the government to build it. This was followed by tests by the QR of the coal for its suitability for locomotives and by the Cairns Gas Company for its suitability for gas making. The Commissioner for Railways recommended the line to parliament, and Select Committees of both houses approved it. The plans were approved on 29th November 1912.
In 1913 the Chillagoe Company, which had continuously over-reached itself, was reconstructed as Chillagoe Limited.
Late in 1914, the government agreed to build the line, on the basis that Chillagoe Ltd purchase 4% Treasury Bills to reimburse the State as construction proceeded. This meant that the ability of the State to build other railways was not diminished, but payment of interest before the line was completed was generous in the extreme.
The company was also to guarantee the State against losses in operation, under the guarantee provisions of the time, by the setting up of a Railway District. The costs included interest on the investment in the line, so the State recovered the interest paid on the debentures, at least so long as Chillagoe Ltd remained in business. The usual provision was that land owners or occupiers in the Railway District had to make up the losses through rates on their land. In this case, the lands were mostly unoccupied, and the line was not built for intervening occupiers. It seems the government had ensured that the construction of the line would not cause expense to the taxpayer, in the immediate and longer term. It was to turn out very differently. If the company was able to buy Treasury Bills to the value of the construction cost, and was to make up losses in operating the line, it is hard to see why it could not have paid for the construction of the line.
At no stage was a "wide-sweeping plan" (whatever that is, p 467) enacted (made law) as Rod Milne says. Other writers who have studied the origins of the place and the line and who do not make sweeping statements, have not detected in their researches any plan, nor any Act which set out how Mt Mulligan was to be developed.
There had been considerable mineral activity in and around Thornborough, which was the headquarters of the Hodgkinson gold field and Woothakata Shire, but this was so much in decline at the time (it lost its separate identity as a goldfield in 1909) that connecting it to the outside world did not feature in the planning of the railway. The road to Thornborough had been able to carry wagons and coaches to provide that town and its mineral field with their communication. There was no road beyond there to Mt Mulligan.
Construction
Special trains ran from Cairns and Chillagoe to Dimbulah for the turning of the first sod in May 1913.
The name of the Governor who turned the first sod of the branch was spelt MacGregor (cf Rod Milne p 468), and the class of engine named after him was a C18. When this was later fitted with larger cylinders, it was classified CC19. It was never a C19.
Construction commenced in September 1913. It was carried out by day labour, and was delayed by repeated strikes and difficulty in obtaining labour. The men refused piece work (which was very much opposed by the union, the AWA, in principle) and successfully struck for a wage of ten shillings per day. There were also strikes about gangers and changes in gangers. Much deficient work had to be remedied later (Cairns Post and Queenslander 1913 and 1914). During the construction period, a little coal was mined, but the transport to the railhead was very difficult.
The engineer supervising construction was W A Hannam, Willoughby Hannam Jr, who was concerned with several railways in north Queensland in the first two decades of the twentieth century.
Opening
The line was completed to Mt Mulligan in September 1914. While the branch was under construction, Chillagoe Ltd was unable to meet interest on its debentures, and was refused a government loan. It immediately closed the Chillagoe smelters and ceased buying ore. It also closed the infant Mt Mulligan coal mine, so that the township was deserted when the railway reached it.
The government arranged for coal orders for the Cairns Railway, the Chillagoe Railway and the Irvinebank smelters. By the end of 1914, a couple of train loads of coal had been taken out of the town.
With copper prices rising during the war, the Chillagoe smelters reopened and development at Mt Mulligan started in earnest.
It was announced in QR Weekly Notice 338 in December 1914 that the line was not to be opened for public traffic but was to remain in charge of the Construction Branch under the control of a QR engineer in Cairns. For the convenience of the small population at Thornborough and Mount Mulligan a motor trolley was run to carry mails, passengers and small parcels.
The branch was opened on the following 7th April 1915. Chillagoe Ltd worked the branch for the Commissioner for Railways, who appointed an agent at Chillagoe to supervise the operation of his three lines which were operated by Chillagoe Ltd until its own railways were taken over by the Commissioner on 20th June 1919.
There were no coal miners in North Queensland. To attract the necessary men, the wages offered to miners were the highest in Australia. This provided an incentive to mechanise the mine. A 300 kW generator was installed to power electric coal cutters. Mechanical cutting, and allowing the mine to collapse behind the mined area (longwall system), produced much dust.
The Mt Mulligan coal mine was the only property of Chillagoe Limited not taken over by the Labour government in 1919 (it took over the railways, smelters and other mines). Even then, the government granted the company a secured loan to develop the Mt Mulligan mine.
Description of the Line
The Track
When the line was approved by parliament, it was intended it be built with 42 lbs to the yard rails, 2288 sleepers and 880 cubic yards of ballast per mile, with 1 in 40 the steepest gradient, and five chains radius the sharpest curve. The land traversed was all owned by the crown, so no resumptions were needed. As built, the 42 lbs rails were in 30 ft lengths, and the joints were staggered. On p 468, Rod Milne says that "light 42 lb or lighter rails were used in the permanent way". Whatever does that mean? On p 469, these are 42 lb and lighter. The rails were 42 lbs, not lighter. Curves were canted for speeds of 20 to 25 mph. The speed limit on the branch was 18 mph, but rail motors were allowed 30 mph. The sleepers were standard QR dimensions, 7 ft long by 4½ ins deep. The formation was 13 ft wide, including side drains.
That leads to the point that it was not the lightness of the track on the branch which limited its use to B15 type locomotives, as claimed by Rod Milne on p 472. It was built to the C16 standard (CCE records) in terms of rail weight, ballast and sleeper spacing, and bridge and culvert strength. The problem was that the lines between Cairns and Dimbulah could take nothing heavier than B15 engines. Hence, short of taking a C16 or C17 to Dimbulah with empty boiler and tender, or partly dismantled, those classes could not reach there. That would have meant that the C16 or C17 would have had to be maintained and serviced at Dimbulah, which was not otherwise a locomotive depot. The same applied to some other lines in the Cairns hinterland. The short turntable at Mt Mulligan could not take engines longer than the B15 types. Had the lines between Redlynch near Cairns and Dimbulah been strengthened to take C16s and C17s, a longer turntable would have been required at Mt Mulligan.
How does Rod Milne know that track conditions on the line were not all they could have been, leading to derailments? I don't know, but the line was substantially built (to C16 standard), and had a large complement of maintenance staff (11.5 on average in 1951-52). As for the vehicles, does he know that the coal was all conveyed in four wheelers, or indeed in hoppers? Not all was. Nor was the rate of derailment of four wheel hoppers, while higher than that of many other wagons, exceptional.
The Route
On p 469 Rod Milne has it that the rough country commenced soon after crossing the Walsh River. The rough country was all in the valley of the Hodgkinson, beyond the summit at 8½ miles. There were settlers near the line for the first four miles by 1932. He also has it that Thornborough was soon after the summit, the divide between the Walsh and Hodgkinson waters. But they are miles apart. The summit was almost at 8½ miles, Thornborough at 17 miles. Dimbulah was at 1512 ft, the summit at 1732 ft on the same datum, Thornborough at 1268 ft, the change from descent to ascent below Mt Mulligan at 1090 ft, and Mt Mulligan 1265 ft, the last at almost the same altitude as Thornborough.
On the same page, he has the mines of Kingsborough and Tyrconnell near the summit, whereas they were closer to Thornborough (see the map on p 468). Thornborough township was about a mile east of the station. It was all but defunct when the line was planned, and no effort was made to have the line go through the township.
The line rapidly lost 50 ft in the 46 chains from the junction to the Walsh River bridge. The 8 miles to the summit averaged 1 in 156. This was followed by 2 3/4 miles which averaged 1 in 64 down, and 3 1/4 easier miles averaging 1 in 107 down, taking the line down to 1338 ft at 14 1/2 miles. The next 12 1/2 miles to 27 miles, just below Mt Mulligan, averaged 1 in 266 down, with only a few modest rising gradients. The last 3 miles into Mt Mulligan took the line up 180 feet, an average of 1 in 83. Further detail below.
Those average gradients seem modest enough, but there were much sharper pinches, and a lot of curvature.
The crossing of the Walsh River involved short 1 in 37-33 on the Dimbulah side, and 1 in 37 on the other, with 16 and 12 chains curves, both gradients taken with momentum. To the 8 1/2 miles summit, curves were easy but frequent, and the hardest gradient was 37 chains of 1 in 53-60 between 5 and 6 miles, and a short 1 in 55 and a quarter mile of 1 in 82½ to the summit.
In the first 2¾ miles down from the summit, the hardest, longest bank in the down direction, the steepest gradient was 1 in 49½ with an average of 1 in 64, with the sharpest curves of 6, 7 and 8 chains radius. Gradients then eased to the 14½ miles to an average of 1 in 107, but near the 12¾ miles there were 13 chains of 1 in 49½ down on a 5 chs radius curve, and up to 14 miles almost all curves were of less than 10 chs radius. All of this was beside the Hodgkinson River, at times in a narrow valley, with numerous cuttings and embankments.
From 14½ to 27 miles, the line was falling gradually, always near the Hodgkinson, at times cutting across bends in it, at other times keeping closer, in places with considerable earthworks, at other times with few. The gradients were mostly easy, but the ruling gradient was encountered for short distances to keep to the alignment or at creek crossings. Curves were not especially numerous, and the sharpest of them were 10 chains radius.
The low point, at 27 miles, was in the vertical curve in the crossing of Mt Mulligan Creek. It was followed by a few chains of 1 in 25 up. On the climb into Mt Mulligan yard, curves were a minimum of five chains radius, the last four being of that radius, with large cuts and fills, and with short 1 in 44s. One 8 chs radius curve between 27 and 28 miles was especially long. There was as little as half a chain of straight between some of these curves. The yard itself included cut and fill, was on 1 in 220 and 132 up for arriving trains, on 20 and 30 chains radius curves.
There were many bridges, mostly of timber, the majority over tributaries of the Hodgkinson, flowing to meet it not far from the line to its east. The Crooked Creek bridge just outside Dimbulah had 6 spans and the Walsh River 42. Bridge 9 near 13½ miles included a 61 feet steel span. Worcester Creek at 22¼ miles included two spans of 31 ft 3 ins and one of 38 ft 6 ins. These too were probably steel. Mt Mulligan Creek at 27 miles had 16 timber spans. Richards Creek bridge of seven spans at 28¾ miles was at the head of a five chains radius horseshoe curve.
The line was not fenced. There were only about ten level crossings - four in the farming area out to 6½ miles, and three (19¾, 20¼ and 26¾ miles) of the track from Thornborough to Mt Mulligan. After the last mileage given, that track almost immediately crossed under the line at the Garden Creek bridge. The level crossing at Thornborough did not appear in the 1935 and 1950 lists. An occupation level crossing was provided in the 1940s at 28 miles 6 chains for the King Cole mine.
What was marked on the plans as a Temporary Water Supply was a steam pumping plant and tank on the north bank of Mt Mulligan Creek, with the tank a little on the town side of the plant.
On p 468 Rod Milne has the line "bridging over small watercourses at the Walsh and Hodgkinson Rivers". What does that mean? The Walsh was indeed crossed, by a bridge with 42 spans. The Hodgkinson was not crossed. It was on the eastern side of the line from 8¾ miles, in some places right beside, at times more distant, and in places the looping to the east to form pockets which the line cut across, but it was not crossed by the railway, as claimed on p 469 (this also corrects my piece "Frequently Crossed Creeks" in "Sunshine Express", May 1994). It crossed many streams entering the Hodgkinson from the west.
On p 472 the branch is described as a tortuous defile. It had up to seven curves to the mile in places, with curves down to five chains radius (near Mt Mulligan) as it was fitted into the narrow valley of the Hodgkinson River, which it followed from 8½ miles to the terminus. But nowhere was it a defile itself, nor did it follow a defile, which is something very much narrower than even the narrowest parts of the valley of the Hodgkinson. I suspect that Rod Milne meant that the line had a tortuous alignment.
The map on p 468 shows Mt Mulligan Creek passing under the line. That is correct, but it almost immediately joined the Hodgkinson. Where the name of the creek is given on the map, the stream is actually the Hodgkinson.
Stopping Places
The 1920 WTT mentions the 40 chains siding and the 45 chains Ballast Siding.
From 1932 provision was made for trains to stop at 3 Miles, in that year to unload for tobacco farmers. By 1939, 3 Miles was a D stop, ie an isolated siding or stopping place, and remained so until closure. Although so given in the Working (staff) Timetable (WTT) and list of stopping places, it was not shown in the public timetable. Traffic to and from 3 Miles was given in Annual Reports from 1934-35 until closure. The highest number of passengers was in that year, 113. Passenger numbers fluctuated, but rose to 86 in 1951-52. Small quantities of agricultural produce were consigned from there, 9 tons the most in any year, the last in 1952-3. Tonnages of inwards goods were highest in 1949-50, 77 tons. There were never any facilities here, so these goods were loaded to and from the brake van. Very possibly, the farmers in the area erected at least a platform for their own convenience.
From 1939, trains stopped as required for passengers and goods at 1 mile 5 chains and 2½ miles. Both remained as stopping places until closure, but after 1949 the provision for stopping at 2½ miles applied in wet weather. As this instruction applied to "trains", apparently goods and coal trains were to stop at those distances too. Neither place was ever recorded in Annual Reports with traffic.
A siding was built during the construction to connect with the road to Wolfram Camp. The mileage was given as 6 miles, 6 miles 20 chs, 6 miles 30 chs and 6½ miles, and was at times called Wolfram Siding. In 1917-18, 45 tons of inwards traffic were received there, but it was otherwise unused. In 1920, The Royal Commission on Public Works recommended against building a railway to Wolfram Camp, from either 16 miles on the Mt Mulligan line or from Dimbulah. That is at least one branch to a mineral area that the taxpayer did not have to pay losses on for years. The road from this siding to Wolfram Camp was improved instead (most references say "built", but it existed before 1920). That road was apparently never used for access to Wolfram Camp. It is not known when the siding was removed, but before 1925.
In 1933 trains stopped at 8 Miles for lengthsmen. In 1938 the up passenger carrying train stopped here for lengthsmen on Mondays, and in 1942 and 1949, 8M mixed stopped on Fridays at 8½ miles for lengthsmen. The 8 Miles was not on the telephone circuit in 1938, but in 1949, the 8½ miles camp was. Annual Reports show 8 miles 40 chs for three years in the thirties with very few passengers and one or two tons of outwards goods. Whether the camp at 8½ miles was permanent I do not know. It would be expected that the gangs would be based at each end of the line. Both the telephone and the provision for a stop might have been an allowance for when there were temporary camps on the line.
Thornborough station had a siding, probably a loop, and a building, which was removed to Pawngilly in 1932-33 In 1950, Thornborough was connected to the railway telephone circuit.
In 1921 Thornborough lost its status as headquarters of the Woothakata Shire to Mareeba, and with that the place, and traffic to and from it, declined considerably. In 1921 it had a population of 58, in 1933 of 29; thereafter it was no longer a locality for Census recording. The Shire was renamed Mareeba between 1947 and 1954.
Until 1923-4, Thornborough averaged 529 passengers booked per year, until 1918-9 more than from Mt Mulligan each year, and until 1922-23 averaged 263 tons of goods inwards per year, again more than Mt Mulligan in some years. In those years, outwards goods were minerals and general merchandise, with a horse one year and 50 sheep in another, the only outwards livestock ever handled there.
There was a brief flurry for three years in the mid thirties, with over 500 tons of goods inward per year, and an average of 450 passengers booked each year. This was the result of renewed interest in gold mining, some of which occurred near Mt Mulligan as well, but it soon petered out. Apart from passengers booked exceeding 100 in the three years 1939-40 and following, there was very little traffic at Thornborough. Small quantities of minerals, timber, firewood and general merchandise were consigned, and small quantities of goods inwards, in some years nil. As the road there was only a track until 1951, that is a good indication that there were then almost no permanent residents anywhere near the place.
For Mt Mulligan station, see below.
The History of the Mines and their Markets
Early Years
In 1915 a Labour government with a commitment to State enterprises came to power. It also had considerable interest through its union connections with Chillagoe, and wished to nationalise the undertakings of Chillagoe Ltd.. This proposal was delayed for some time by the Legislative Council, during which time £90,000 was lent to Chillagoe Ltd to develop Mt Mulligan. Until that loan was repaid, the price for coal sold to the government was limited to a modest profit on cost.
Once the metalliferous mines, smelters and railways of Chillagoe Ltd were nationalised in 1919, Mt Mulligan was the sole property of Chillagoe Ltd. By 1920, it was an advanced mine, with an endless ropeway having replaced winding, a 2 ft gauge tramway to the tippler where coal was loaded direct to railway trucks, and an enlarged dam on top of the mountain to provide water for coal washing, steam raising for electricity generation for the mine, dust laying and domestic supply. There was another dam on Slip Creek below the town. Electricity provided lighting, winding and coal cutting in the mine.
By 1921 Mt Mulligan had 339 citizens, with 90 miners on the books of the mining union there. There were insufficient houses, and some lived in corrugated iron huts and tents. There were two hotels, a church and five stores. A school had opened in 1915, and by 1921 had two teachers and 74 pupils. The only access to the town was by the railway. For use in cases of emergency, a rail motor ambulance was provided in 1920. One recreation was visiting Thornborough, the old gold township, by pump trolley.
The Coal Industry
Mt Mulligan coal was of low quality, and, as it turned out, was not suitable for making coke, the main reason the mine was opened up and the branch railway built. For many years of its existence, the QR was the only large customer, an enforced one at that. Despite the mechanisation, the productivity in the mine was almost always the lowest of all underground mines in Queensland, and the coal the most expensive at the pit head.
Rod Milne claims on p 468 that there were two main destinations for Mt Mulligan coal, Chillagoe and Mt Garnet. Chillagoe consumed modest quantities of Mt Mulligan coal, as did the smelters at Irvinebank. Smelting needed coke, and Mt Mulligan coal proved unsuited to coking. Coal went to Mt Garnet in any quantity only after 1943, and was a movement not anticipated when the Mt Mulligan line was built. During the following 13 years, about 130,000 tons went there, but the flow was not constant - it ceased when the tin dredge was not operating. During the years coal moved from Mt Mulligan to Mt Garnet, a considerable proportion of the output of the two mines at Mt Mulligan went to Mt Garnet, but it was not especially significant over the life of the Mt Mulligan branch, and even when coal moved to Mt Garnet, that was not the largest customer.
The main destinations of Mt Mulligan coal were Mareeba and Cairns, because the major customer was the QR, something Rod Milne does not mention. The State Transport Commission noted that in 1939, that of some 20,000 tons produced per annum on the field, 14,000 tons went to the QR. The QR consumption in other years can be found by subtracting the tons of coal despatched from Mt Mulligan in QR reports (this being public, paying, traffic) from the output of the field. The QR consumed no more Mt Mulligan coal than it could avoid. After the North Coast Line was completed, the supply to the QR was mostly confined to Mareeba depot, Cairns being supplied so far as possible from the more distant Collinsville, while private users on the coast, including sugar mills and gas works, used Newcastle or Collinsville. Later, the QR had to again take Mt Mulligan coal at Cairns because insufficient Collinsville coal was available. Indeed, the State Transport Commission, reporting on loss making branch lines in 1939 noted that Townsville often had difficulty obtaining sufficient Collinsville coal for its needs, and that Mt Mulligan was indispensable to the QR in the Cairns district. Some of the coal was sent to Almaden and Mt Garnet for topping up tenders at those places, and it is possible that coal was supplied direct from the mine to locomotive tenders at Mt Mulligan.
Left to itself, the QR would probably not have used Mt Mulligan coal, but was probably forced to do so to keep the mine open. As well as the loss on the mine itself (see below), hauling coal in light trains on steeply graded lines was very expensive for the QR. It probably lost money even at ordinary rates, while the haul to Tableland Tin near Mt Garnet was granted a preferential rate. Notable indeed, rather noted for being expensive, and as Bell notes, for having the threat of closure always hanging over it because it was not profitable.
Development of the mine was almost always hindered by shortages of labour and often by water shortage. The average wages in the town were reported to be the highest in Australia to attract the necessary labour.
Two seams were worked. Two conveyors were installed underground to convey coal to the wheeling road, that from which it was raised to the surface. Water sprays were installed to lay dust. A one mile surface tramway from no. 3 tunnel to the screens, with bridges and a viaduct, was completed.
The Disaster and Aftermath
The explosion at the mine at 0925 on 19th September 1921 was of coal dust. Inflammable gas was never encountered in the Mt Mulligan mines. The explosion was heard at Thornborough, over 20 kms away. All those underground were killed, instantly. The terrible loss of life, taken as 76, was nevertheless lower than the numbers killed at two NSW disasters, Bulli and Mt Kembla. With poor understanding and poor communications, large scale rescue operations were nevertheless instituted, in which the railway featured. All of these achieved nothing.
Miners from Tryconnell gold mine at Kingsborough arrived by pump car from Thornborough. A train arrived from Mareeba with doctors, nurses, ambulance men and volunteers, and with the fan from the Biboohra meatworks. Two trains came from Cairns, with doctors, police, volunteers, fans and coffins. A fourth train came from the Chillagoe district, with miners, a mines inspector, fans and gas masks. Few of all these people were useful, and the doctors and nurses left soon after arrival. The Chillagoe area volunteers completed the search for and removal of the bodies.
The underground damage was not severe. A rapid exodus of the population was followed by a gradual return and reopening of the mine. At the time, the demand for its output was high. The Royal Commission into the disaster noted that the mine was not producing enough for district (really regional) requirements - the QR (the biggest customer), sugar mills, saw mills, meatworks, metalliferous mines and smelters. The Chillagoe State Smelters wanted coke, not yet produced. The government made a grant of £50,000 to the company. The 1921 production was 70% of that for 1920. The mine nominally reopened in February 1922, but there was an immediate strike, and mining did not recommence until May. With the industrial disputes, only 2500 tons were produced in 1922 until the end of May, but by the end of November the monthly output was 3151 tons, so that the 1922 output was almost identical to the 1920 figure.
The Coke Works
The coke works, which were the inspiration for the development of the mine, had just commenced preliminary operations at the time of the 1921 explosion. Like the mine, these works were highly mechanised. Fourteen brick retorts were constructed beside the railway. The coal was mechanically screened, ground to a uniform size and washed in an automatic plant, and fed to the retorts by a travelling hopper. The coke was to be discharged directly to the railway trucks. The plan was to use the gas from the coke works in the steam plant to generate the electricity for the mine (then absorbing 120 tons of coal per month), but that was not installed.
The coke works were successfully fired for the first time in August 1922, and the first shipment of coke railed to Chillagoe the same month. Difficulties were soon encountered, partly with the design, but mostly with the coal., which was found not suited to coking. It was found too high in ash. There was a strike early in 1923, after which the coke works stayed shut until 1924.
The coke works were refurbished and fired in January 1924. They ran for about four months and closed in May, it is said on account of large coal orders to the QR and a shortage of miners, leading to the closure of No. 1 seam. Although various mixes of coal were still being experimented with in mid 1924, the works were not used again, mostly because the coal was not suited to coking. In 1923-4, £4887 were lost on the coke operation.
Even without the problems with the coal, coke production from Mulligan coal proved too expensive, and coke for Chillagoe continued to come from NSW and the UK until the State coke works opened at Bowen in 1933 (there had been small coke works elsewhere in the State before that).
The State Mine
On p 467, Rod Milne claims that development of a State mine at the site was viewed as a priority by 1910. That is quite wrong. The government of the day preferred to avoid involvement of the State with mining. As the above should clarify, the idea of State ownership came later. On pp 469-70, Rod Milne places the disaster and the government takeover in correct chronological order, but he does not give the circumstances, which were complicated, as above. .
Rod Milne says on p 469 that the mine at Mt Mulligan was a big State Mine, a notable industry. He has obviously not consulted the writings of those who have researched coal mining at Mt Mulligan, let alone any primary sources, like the reports of the Mining Wardens, or Mines Inspectors. It was neither of the things he calls it. The State Mine at Mt Mulligan was a small producer, and was notable for low productivity, financial losses, and industrial unrest. And it was let on tribute for extended periods and not operated by the State at all.
The disaster much worsened the shaky finances of Chillagoe Ltd. It could not finance necessary replacements, and had not met payment provisions on the government loan to develop the mine. In June 1923, it offered to sell the mine to the government; in effect, the government foreclosed on the loan. The government agreed, paying £5,500, but cancelling all debt due to it. The government took over on 1st July 1923. The company was then wound up. It had benefited considerably from government largesse, with loans, grants, and nationalisations, losses on the Mt Mulligan railway, and of course 4% paid on the cost of building the line. The Mt Mulligan mine was thereby added to the raft of mines and two smelters in the Cairns hinterland and the railways connecting and serving them which were already in government ownership. They almost all always ran at a loss. Some of the railway loss was not easily sheeted home - eg preferential rail rates were granted to rail copper ore from the Cloncurry field to Chillagoe smelters.
In the early years of government ownership, there was considerable development work in the mine. The top seam was abandoned, the middle seam working extended, and an additional cutting machine installed. The electricity supply was improved. The conveyors were found unsuitable, and were removed. Screens were installed, along with a picking table so that stone could be removed. Twelve new cottages were built. Coal bins with a capacity of 3000 tons were installed to remove the hold ups which occurred when no rail trucks were available (in the first year of state ownership, 16½ days production were lost on account of shortage of railway trucks, including 14 complete days. The bins also saved the opposite - idle trucks awaiting coal. The bins thereby allowed continuous train operation, and meeting large orders. Production in 1923 was 32,618 tons, an increase of over 10,000 tons on 1922.
Water supply proved a problem in part of the first year of state operation. It was necessary to pump from the river, and trench it (dig channels in the bed) to maintain the supply. No mention was made in the Manager's report of this affecting output, or water being railed in.
The production of the field seem to have been reported in different ways over the years. At the most, the figure is what was weighed as the coal was raised. At least, it excludes coal used at the mine for power for electricity (the mine was highly electrified and mechanised), and material discarded in preparation and washing (stone and dirt).
Production gradually increased from the 10,100 tons of 1915 to 23,600 tons in 1920. In the disaster year of 1921, output was 16,400 tons, and in the following year 22,500 tons. 1923 to 1926 were the years of highest output, when the mine had a monopoly of coal supply in the area north of Townsville. Outputs were 32,600, 44,400, 43,400 and 36,900 tons. During the busiest years, employment reached 160 and two shifts were worked. In the last of these years, the mine had to close for a time on account of water shortage.
In 1927, production fell considerably, partly from the closure of Chillagoe State Smelter resulting in a great reduction in railway traffic, and partly from competition with better coal from the Collinsville field, to which the railway opened in 1922. Collinsville coal was able to reach the area north of Townsville by rail after the completion of the North Coast Line between Townsville and Cairns in 1924. For three years to 1929, output at Mt Mulligan averaged 21,800 tons.
The Moore government (1929 to 1932), the first non-Labour government since 1914, decided to close the Mt Mulligan mine. The union arranged for its operation by miners as tributers, and the government agreed. The government paid the manager's salary, insurance and workers' compensation insurance, and the 1/- per ton due to the executors of the Irvinebank Company. The tributers paid the State 5/- per ton royalty on all coal consumed at the mine. The tributers took over the mine in October 1929, and the mine remained on tribute until 1947 (until 1941 union based, then to independent miners).
In 1930, output was only 12,000 tons, the lowest apart from the early years, and 1948, the year of a prolonged industry wide strike. At the beginning of the year, the mine was idle for a month on account of rain water coming into the mine, the result of breaks in the surface from subsidence and inadequate pumping arrangements, a problem encountered in 1929 also. Then at the end of the year, the mine was idle for three months after the generator failed.
Surprisingly, the Moore government eventually reopened the Chillagoe State Smelters, but that was of minor advantage to Mt Mulligan, because almost all the fuel for Chillagoe was obtained from elsewhere. Bunker sales fell off as coal was less and less used for fuelling ships, even steam ships. Mt Mulligan was left with the railways, which themselves suffered a decline in business.
In the 14 years 1931 to 1945, production averaged 20,000 tons per year. A new generating plant was installed in 1931 and additional pumping capacity installed. The airways were improved in various years to improve ventilation. Temperatures underground were nevertheless often very high. Development work and new equipment were financed by the Mines Department. . Maintenance was not kept up (the State had to buy the replacement generator when the earlier broke down). From 1943, a start was made on improved machines, with a coal cutting machine and an electric borer. Coal from some of the seams proved unsaleable (eg the top seam in 1945) or unworkable, and new ones, with associated tunnelling were then pursued. The middle seam opened up after 1945 proved better. The tributers nevertheless moved into debt, and the State had to spend to keep up operations.
When the tributers owed the State over £20,000, the State resumed control of the mine in 1947. Losses then began to mount: the miners were then employed on award wages, and were not concerned about profitability. Outputs were very poor. In 1948, the year after resumption of state operation, 1.82 tons were produced per man shift, compared with the Queensland average for underground mines of 3.49 tons. In that year, staff at the mine was 59 underground and 25 on the surface. There were industrial disputes early in the year.
Mt Mulligan coal was barely competitive for the QR at Cairns. It 1947, it cost the QR a little more at Cairns than did Collinsville, but it was less favoured, because it was dirty, high in ash and clinkered. Apart from the QR and Tableland Tin, there were only four other customers, who bought occasional truck loads.
Some of the production of the State Mine had been going to Tableland Tin at Mt Garnet. When the King Cole mine was opened (see next section) as a private mine at Mt Mulligan specifically to supply Mt Garnet, the output of the State Mine fell to 16,500 tons in 1946 and 1947. In 1948, production was only 5238 tons, on account of a prolonged strike. From 1949 to 1952, annual production averaged 15,300 tons. It then increased significantly to 24,700 tons in 1953, followed by 21,000 and 20,000, but then only 16,000 in 1956, the last full year of production. A new client, the Cairns Harbour Board, took the coal in 1952. Much of the surface plant was updated in the 1950s and facilities provided for miners. In 1953, the power for the mine electricity generation was turned over from steam to diesel alternators, saving 14,000 gallons of water per day. In 1954, machine cutters were in use, and two shifts per day worked.
A Second Mine, King Cole
The tin dredge of Tableland Tin NL near Mt Garnet was originally directly steam powered, and later was electrically driven, with the electricity generated by the company by steam. Principals of the company opened a new mine at Mt Mulligan on the mountain face at the southern end of "the gorge" in a geologically unstable region. The No. 1 adit developed in 1907 was reopened, and retimbered, and named King Cole Mine. It employed men laid off at the State Mine, and commenced operation in 1943. Its siding was said to be ready for use in QR Weekly Notice 8/43. Production was not separately recorded until 1945, but the railings show it produced about 6000 tons for the first two years. Although only one skip was filled at a time, the wheeling distance was short The coal was better than that at the State Mine. Production per man day was much higher than at the State Mine, however, and its staff never exceeded 20. As the King Cole output was well below the quantity railed into Tableland Tin in several years, the State Mine also supplied coal to Mt Garnet in any case (see below). It is not clear why the State Mine could not have supplied the whole of the Tableland Tin requirement. King Cole was possibly set up to obtain coal at lower cost than that from the State Mine, which was the most highly priced coal in the State.
The new mine had difficulty finding tramway rails. In 1944, the aerial tramway from Irvinebank was installed at the pit head.
The mine produced for fourteen years, a total of 106,000 tons, an average of 7600 per year, a maximum of 12,200 tons in 1951 and a minimum of 2035 in 1953. In 1952-53, when the Mt Garnet operation ceased operation for a year, on account of relocating the dredge near Mt Garnet, most of the staff was dismissed (see below).
King Cole Mine attempted to find other markets. John Kerr recorded special rates being granted from the mine to Hubert Wells (a pumping station in Townsville) and Home Hill (where extensive pumping was practised to irrigate sugar cane).
In 1939, the State Mine produced 28,000 tons. The output of the field, produced by two mines after King Cole opened, barely exceeded that figure, by 1500 or so tons only, until the two mines closed. Such occurred in 1951, 1954 and 1955. The maximum combined output did not come to more than two-thirds the output of the State Mine alone in the mid 1920s.
Progress at Mt Mulligan
Bell describes (p xv) Mt Mulligan as an absolute dead end, a state or company town, with no incidental travellers passing through or diversity of commerce. Other parts of his book and Mining Wardens' reports show the place to have lacked elementary amenities until very late, although it did receive an ice plant in 1924 and a hospital in 1936.
Skilled labour was always in short supply. Isolation and living conditions did not encourage skilled workers to come there. In 1950 a diesel plant was installed to provide electricity to the township, and in 1951 a road was formed to Dimbulah, said in reports of the day to be a much desired outlet. In 1956 it was reported that the Coal Board had subsidised the cartage of water to the township in dry seasons, that a water supply scheme was in progess, and assistance given to the levelling of the aerodrome (1956 QPD, Parliamentary Questions).
The town was improved. A post office and another church were built and a few substantial private houses. Although the population increased by only 51 between the 1947 and 1954 censuses, the number of occupied dwellings increased from 74 to 91. Streets were formed. The first motor vehicles appeared in the town.
Bell also notes that as the mine was never profitable, it always existed in the shadow of financial ruin, resulting from the ability of other mines to supply its market more cheaply. Postwar, Collinsville coal could be landed in Cairns for about the same price as Mt Mulligan. Collinsville was much better coal, and the mines there were much more financially secure than Mt Mulligan.
[Photo 12957 and 18045 of Mt Mulligan to insert]
Rail Motor Ambulance
The story of the rail motor ambulances based at Mt Mulligan from 1920 until the closure of the line is given in my article on the subject in ARHS Bulletin for May 1990. Any reasonable historian who is content to give a subject like this a passing mention would at least say where more complete information can be found, but not Rod Milne. Three different rail motor ambulances were based at Mt Mulligan, as detailed on pp 119 and 120 of my 1990 article. How much they were used is not known. Even after the small hospital was established at Mt Mulligan in 1936, continued use could have been expected, in view of the need to ferry complicated and urgent cases to bigger hospitals, and the absence of a road or airstrip at Mt Mulligan until the very end. QR File 46.8500 (QSA 12872) reveals that the sheds for the cars were located between the trolley shed (for QR track maintenance) and home signal, before the cutting at the entrance to the yard. A concrete foundation from the shed for the earlier cars was still present at that location in 1946, and was used for the new shed for the car which was provided for Mt Mulligan that year.
Traffic Volume and Train Mileage
Until the Chillagoe Railway was taken over by the State in 1919, the Mt Mulligan branch was operated for the QR by Chillagoe Ltd. As it was an isolated government line connecting with the company's line from Mareeba to Mungana, that made sense. The Commissioner for Railways had an agent at Chillagoe, to supervise the operation of his lines (Etheridge, Mt Garnet - also isolated QR lines - and Mt Mulligan) by the Chillagoe Company. The Agent's report was included in the QR Annual Report. It is possible to deduce from the train mileage statistics that in the years to 1919, three or four productive trains ran each way per week. The unproductive mileage includes shunting and the ballast trains run in connection with large scale damage to the line from heavy rainfall in those years.
For 1915-16, that coal traffic was below expectations on account of inadequate mine appliances. Enough was turned out for the QR, Irvinebank Company, Chillagoe Company, and Cairns Harbour Board. Down traffic was nearly all coal, a little antimony. There was very little up loading. For most part two timetable trains and a couple of specials per week were sufficient. There was heavy flood damage expenditure.
|
Year |
Productive train miles |
Unproductive train miles |
Passengers |
Goods Tons |
Revenue |
Working Expenses |
Loss (a) |
|
1914-15 |
1,980 |
na |
1042 |
2,336 |
£429 |
£870 |
£441 |
|
1915-16 |
11,076 |
3234 |
2172 |
14,628 |
£2291 |
£3669 |
£1378 |
|
1916-17 |
8,666 |
2342 |
1835 |
10,750 |
£1787 |
£3431 |
£1644 |
|
1917-18 |
11,231 |
2146 |
1830 |
12,901 |
£2042 |
£3606 |
£1564 |
|
1918-19 |
14,559 |
2249 |
1843 |
16,009 |
£2137 |
£3970 |
£1833 |
(a) The loss of was made up by the Chillagoe Company.
For 1916-17 the agent reported that the line was well maintained, with a good running top, but that the formation and cuttings suffered from landslip and heavy rains. The mine was unable to fill contracts. There were some landslips during the 1917-18 wet season. During 1918-19, there was no wet weather damage. In September 1918 the service was reduced to one train per week on account of labour trouble in the mine. That cannot have lasted long, as the productive train mileage averages almost five trains per week over the year. During these early years, more passengers were booked from Thornborough than from Mt Mulligan, and more passengers came to the line from Chillagoe Railway stations than from Cairns Railway (QR) stations. Most of the coal went to Chillagoe Railway stations, which then included Boonmoo for transfer to the tramway to Stannary Hills and Irvinebank.
The tonnage carried on the line followed the output of the field (ie both mines after King Cole opened), and of course included the coal hauled for the QR itself, which was the majority. The coal production is given above with the history of the mines. Its maximum was in the mid 1920s, and the highest output reached in the period coal moved to Mt Garnet was only about two-thirds that maximum.
The maximum number of trains run on the branch, timetabled and extras, did not coincide with the highest tonnages, because some of the trains were then double headed. The number per week during the period the line was operated by Chillagoe Ltd was three to four. In 1923-24, over seven per week ran, and that with some of the trains double headed. In 1930-31, only two per week ran. Thereafter with trains normally run with single engines, the number per week increased during the thirties, to reach almost six before the war broke out, and further with the traffic to Mt Garnet, to over eight per week in 1951-52. Thereafter, up to 1956-57, the number averaged close to seven per week.
Traffic into Mt Mulligan and Outwards Traffic apart from Coal
The goods traffic inwards was determined by the population, and works at the mine and in the town. Up to 1919, the inwards tonnage averaged a very modest 290 tons per annum. Then, presumably with mechanisation at the mine, the tonnage was 2004 in 1919-20, followed by 1471, 1076 and 540.
The census figures for the township are:
|
Year |
Occupied dwellings |
Population |
|
1921 |
100 |
339 |
|
1933 |
72 |
286 |
|
1947 |
74 |
308 |
|
1954 |
91 |
359 |
The maximum production of coal and highest employment at the mine was in the mid 1920s, when 160 were employed. The population must then have been about 500. This led to inward tonnages of 1854, 1138 and 853. The last four years of the 1920s were the nadir in (normal) coal production, employment and population. During those years, average inward traffic was 700 tons. In most years, the wardens’ or inspectors' reports give the number employed at the two coal mines. In 1940, the State Mine employed 89 (production 21,336 tons). In 1946, it employed 52 on average, and in 1955 79. The King Cole employed 10 in 1942, 24 in 1949 and 15 in 1955. Maximum employment in the mines postwar was therefore in the 90s, well below the highest figure for the State Mine alone of 160 in the mid 1920s.
In the 1930s, the average employment was 75, population probably about 300, and the average tons in 427. For seven years to 1946, the average inwards tonnage was 495.
Postwar, the inwards tonnages were much higher, even though the population was only a little higher than in the thirties. For two years, they averaged about 1000, then for the last nine years, averaged 2500, with a maximum of 5002 in 1953-54. Diesel fuel for the town electricity supply (based on the number of houses) was about 100 tons per year, and for the mine electricity supply (based on the water consumption of the previous steam plant) about 625 tons per annum. Little improvement was made to the mines at the time. The higher tonnages require further explanation, such as improved housing, higher consumption with higher incomes, machinery and goods for improvements to the town, a few motor vehicles and fuel for them.
Even the highest inward tonnage, 5002, is only about 20 tons per working day, or 13 tons per train which ran that year, so there was not much impact on the need to haul empty wagons outwards.
Passengers booked until postwar were highest at the time of highest population and production, in the mid twenties, with a maximum of 1703 in 1924-25, and an average of 1634 over four consecutive years. Thos numbers declined to a minimum of 442 in 1930-31. There were then busier years in the mid 1930s with an average of 1550, probably the result of gold and other mining activity in the area. The average from 1936-37 to 1940-41 was 900, from 1941-42 to 1947-48 1215. Then followed the busiest years for passengers, from 1948-49 to 1954-55, when an average of 2374 travelled (an average of 15 per advertised passenger carrying train) with a maximum of 2987 in 1950-51. For a population of only about 350, this amounts to 8.5 journeys per person per year, a very high figure for the time, especially considering the poor service offered, and the lack of nearby places as destinations. Of course, the busiest time must have been the Christmas - New Year holidays, for the school and the mines. It is difficult to imagine that the Tuesdays return service to Mareeba on two days per month which started in 1948 would have attracted so much extra traffic to bring about these numbers. The availability of the road is presumably the reason for the average number declining to 1229 in 1955-56 and 1956-57.
(The passengers on chartered special trains and rail motors for football and other purposes are not included in the above figures; they were counted under Head Office or the regional administrative offices.)
There was little outwards traffic other than coal, some minerals and some general merchandise (personal effects, returned empties, etc). The minerals reached a maximum of 314 tons in 1940-41, probably fluorspar (calcium fluoride). In 1956-57, a special rate was declared for fluorspar from Mt Mulligan to Cairns, for the familiar reason, "to assist industry". Whether any such traffic moved before the line closed is not known. The 458 tons of general merchandise railed out in 1931-32 is difficult to explain, but might be scrap from the mine. In 1957-58 968 tons were railed out, and in 1958-59 (after closure), 233, these including buildings, machinery, personal effects etc railed out as the town was removed.
There was no livestock traffic - the area was not used for commercial grazing. A few horses were railed out, a maximum of 42 in 1945-46, but none at all in many years. Horses were probably bred in the town for transport in a place with no motor roads, even for racing as a recreation, and the excess railed out for sale or to try their ability at racecourses. Two cattle were also railed out, possibly the excess of those bred for meat in the town.
Train Services
I have examined the WTTs for the services on the line, as well as those Holidays Timetable Alterations which survive.
In 1921, M. Rowan, the teacher at Kingsborough school, was going to catch the train at Thornborough to travel to and open the school at Mt Jackson (near Georgetown) on 24th January. He was unable to do so, because the Tuesday train was cancelled, on account of the Mt Mulligan coal miners strike. He was therefore five days late opening his new school (Education Dept, Mt Jackson school file, QSA)
The passenger and mails (coaching) service was provided by mixed trains or goods with passenger accommodation attached (GWPA). Until 1925, there were two mixeds per week, outbound on Wednesdays and Fridays, returning next day. In 1927 and 1928, there was one mixed each way per week, out on Wednesdays, returning on Thursdays. On account of this poor service, school holidays in the town were arranged so that the first day of the holidays was a Thursday and the last a Wednesday.
In 1929, the mixed was altered to a GWPA, and it ran as shown on p 472, up on Wednesday and Friday, and down on Thursday.only. The Friday up GWPA returned as a goods on Friday evening. The coaching service was then a GWPA until 1942. In 1931, it ran twice weekly, up on Mondays and Fridays, return the next day. From 1932, the down train on Tuesdays and Saturdays left Mt Mulligan much earlier than needed to connect with the down Chillagoe line mixed, because on those days it continued through Dimbulah to Mareeba (see below).
From 1935, the GWPA was altered to run up on Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays, returning on Tuesdays and Saturdays; the Wednesday up returned to Dimbulah on Wednesday night. From 1940, this was altered so that the Wednesday up returned on Thursday mornings, at an hour which gave reasonable connection to the down mixed on the Chillagoe line. From 1942, these thrice weekly trains became mixed trains again (the Tuesday and Saturday extensions to Mareeba remained goods).
This corrects what Rod Milne says on p 470 about the public services all being GWPA until 1942. Only for the years 1929 to 1942 were they so designated.
I have not seen any timetable alterations which covered what Rod Milne reports as the 1938 coal strike. But I think that the service he reports during that strike is nonsense. He claims there was an up train on Mondays, engine and crew at Mt Mulligan all week, returning at the end of the week, as he reports it to "hang about all week shunting the yard". What shunting would there have been? With the mine closed, there were no coal wagons, empty or loaded, to move, and the wagons for the supplies to the town would have been placed for unloading on arrival, and withdrawn on departure. The QR would not have paid a train crew to camp all week at Mt Mulligan to do nothing. If there was an up train early in the week and a down at the end, these were almost certainly two separate trains, each returning the same day, or the next day, to connect with the mixeds from and to Cairns on the Chillagoe line. He has probably misread the timetable, which almost certainly showed the normal up GWPA on Mondays and Fridays and down on Tuesdays and Saturdays, the only cancellation during the strike being the Wednesday service.
Rod Milne fails to point out that from 1932, on Tuesdays and Saturdays, the GWPA or mixed, left Mt Mulligan very early, at times varying between 5.20 and 6 am, and arrived Dimbulah hours before the through down mixed on the Chillagoe line. The reason is that the Dimbulah engine and one of the Dimbulah crews provided a service from Dimbulah to Mareeba and return on those two days. On arrival from Mt Mulligan, the engine was turned and the train suitably remade, to run to Mareeba, arriving there about 10 am, providing a connection there into the Ravenshoe to Cairns service. The return left Mareeba in the afternoon, connecting from the Cairns to Ravenshoe service, and allowing some shopping time in Mareeba. The train also took coal for Mareeba and returned with empty coal wagons.
(For a period from 1935, the Tuesday down from Dimbulafh to Mareeba on these timetables came from State Smelters (Chillagoe) and the Saturday up returned there. That presumably allowed the Chillagoe based engine to be changed. It was not possible for these extensions to/from Chillagoe to have been operated by the Dimbulah engine and crew, because there were trains on the Mt Mulligan line on Mondays. These extensions to and from State Smelters later disappeared.)
Then from 1948, there was an addition to the passenger carrying trains on the Mt Mulligan line, again not mentioned by Rod Milne. On the first and third Tuesdays of the month, the return train from Mareeba continued from Dimbulah to Mt Mulligan, as a goods (not a GWPA). This was shown in the public timetable. It retained its train number from Mareeba, 76. This was the only example shown in WTTs of trains on this branch line not having a suffix M to their number, and not being a number lower than ten. This train ran the branch in 105 or 110 minutes, faster than the ordinary GWPAs/mixeds, and was timed to arrive Mt Mulligan variously at 7.30 and 8 pm. It allowed Mt Mulligan people a few hours in Mareeba two days per month. For this continuation to Mt Mulligan, the engine had to be turned and the train remade at Dimbulah.
As trains from Dimbulah were up, no trains in that direction carried the number one, as Rod Milne suggests on p 471.
On p 471 Rod Milne opines on the trains during the miners' Christmas holidays. Most of the booklets giving timetable alterations at holiday times which survive show the branch to have been very meanly treated. At Easter, trains were cancelled in such a way that leaving the town for a few days was made impossible without being absent from work on at least one working day outside the holidays. The same applied at Christmas. While miners’ holidays no doubt applied at Christmas, and most of the residents were away, those who remained had their chances of a short break thwarted. In 1937, however, when Christmas was on a Saturday, trains were altered so that it was possible to leave Mt Mulligan at 8 am on the Friday, and continue to Mareeba and on to Cairns. In 1938, a similar alteration was made to allow a similar journey on Maundy Thursday. Presumably, much the same applied for the remainder of the existence of the line.
No mention is made in the extant holiday alterations booklets of the start and end of the miners' holidays. As it seems no special trains ran, the holidays must have been timed to suit the normal public timetable. Extra passenger accommodation must have been provided on those mixed or GWPA trains to provide for a large proportion of the population of the place, say four carriages in addition to the usual carriage with guard's compartment, with space for around 200 passengers. Depending on the carriages used, that could well have converted the mixed or GWPA to a passenger train, especially in the up direction.
The WTTs also provided for regular goods trains apart from the mixeds and GWPAs, and as required goods trains. When the traffic was irregular, even regular goods trains were no doubt cancelled, and trains in addition to those shown in the WTTs arranged, to suit the traffic offering. The following summarises the number of regular (R), and as required (Q), trains shown in those timetables per week (in addition to the mixeds or GWPAs). The up trains include some engine and van services, on the basis that all the empties needed were already at Mt Mulligan. These were probably converted to goods on occasion. The numbers are: until 1920 nil; 1920 to 1925 3 R and 9 Q; until 1928 6 Q; 1929 10 Q (not all of these could run with one engine and the regular GWPA); 1930 6 Q; 1931 to 1935 1 R and 2 Q; 1935 to 1939 6 Q; 1940-1 5R; 1942 2 R: 1943 2R and 3 Q; 1944 4 R and 6 Q: 1945 4R and 5 Q: 1946 4 R and 2 Q; 1947-8 4 R and 3 Q; 1949 to 1951 3 R and 1 Q; 1953 to end 3 R and 3 Q.
From 1945 until the closure, there was a return goods on Monday, Wednesday and Friday mornings, except on the Wednesday after the first and third Tuesday when the up component of this return was not needed because the engine and crew were already at Mt Mulligan off 76 the night before, as above. There was also an as required return train on Thursday afternoons. Those trains which returned same day spent 1¾ to 2½ hours at Mt Mulligan, plenty of time to shunt the small trains, and shunt the King Cole mine.
This timetable neatly occupied two train crews and one engine. It is possible that the engine was coaled at the State Mine at Mt Mulligan. Such was done at various coal mines in the State.
There was scope for an extra run on the branch after the mixed or GWPA had reached Mt Mulligan on Monday, Wednesday and Friday afternoons, going to Dimbulah and return.
Rod Milne speculates about crossings occuring on the line. The 1929 timetable allowed for as required goods trains to cross at Dimbulah and for one such to follow the regular GWPA from Mt Mulligan on Thursdays. This would have required two engines, when the running of other as required goods trains would not. It is not likely that the crossings and following movement occurred.
On p 473, Rod Milne says "crossings would have been reasonably common at Mount Mulligan at those times, the yard having enough siding accommodation ….". It is not clear what "those times" were, but they were presumably the times when the number of trains was at its height. This represents wishful thinking. As the author clearly didn't know, it is also unnecessary thinking, or dreaming. As the line was then operated by one engine and two crews based at Dimbulah, extra trains would not have been run with another engine. That is not to say there were never second trains, and that tickets were never issued with one train following another. Inspections by senior officials, probably mostly by rail motor, could have provided workings on ticket and crossings.
On the occasion of the explosion at the mine in 1921, a rail motor ran from Chillagoe, and special trains from Mareeba and Cairns. This almost certainly resulted in more than one train being at Mt Mulligan at the same time.
The only other timetables which showed any crossings were those of 1953 to 1957 inclusive. In these, 8M mixed on Fridays crossed 11M as required goods at Mt Mulligan, 10 minutes from arrival to departure, and 76 on the first and third Tuesdays crossed 13 M as required goods at Mt Mulligan (five minutes). These crossings are unlikely to have occurred. They required two engines to operate the branch and the Dimbulah to Mareeba services for just those days. The regular goods and mixed trains, as well as the Mareeba service on Tuesdays and Saturdays, could be run by one engine and two crews at Dimbulah. There was ample scope for the one engine and those crews to make extra runs if necessary without running the trains which made these crossings. The trains which were involved in those crossings could not have been run by any timed Mt Garnet trains, which ran from Mareeba to Mt Garnet as one shift each way, and took coal from Dimbulah to Mt Garnet. They could of course have been run by special engines and vans run from Mareeba, with a crew from there who knew the line.
Were special trains run for water? The mine boilers for electricity generation used 14,000 gallons of water per day (remarked on in the 1953 Mines Report when a diesel plant replaced the steam). Water was also needed for dust laying, coal washing and domestic purposes. Despite Mt Mulligan receiving about 800 mm of rain per year on average, that rainfall was not completely reliable, and there were drought periods. When local water supplies ran out, mine production ceased. The longest period when the mine had to close on account of lack of water was for some months at the end of 1926, relieved by rain in December. Lack of water was still affecting operations early in 1927, when coal washing had to cease. But no water was railed in at this time - the tonnage of goods into Mt Mulligan in 1926-7 was much the same as in adjacent years. Bell records that there were times after 1945 when the mine closed in the dry season on account of shortage of water.
The Coal Board paid for the cartage of water in some years in the fifties (answer to question in parliament 30th August 1956). This was probably for the domestic supply. It is not known where the cartage was from. It could have been all local, in tanks on motor trucks. If it was railed in, and Dimbulah had sufficient supply to help Mt Mulligan, at the freight rates of the time, the amount paid would have moved about half a million gallons from there, about 170 full FGW gins or water trucks. If this movement occurred, the water trucks almost certainly came on scheduled trains.
If there were ever special trains for water, they could have brought about 13,000 gallons per train. An up train hauled by a B15 Converted, 125 tons full load, after a TW gin for the locomotive and a CB or other lightest brake van, would have allowed 105 tons of loaded gins. Depending on the types used, this would have allowed between 12,000 and 14,000 gallons per train.
Apart from the cost of water and freight, it is possible that when Mt Mulligan was short of water, the rest of the Tablelands region was short too, and not much could be obtained to supply Mt Mulligan (the tin dredge at Mt Garnet had to cease operation in dry times).
At the time of the question in 1956, the Coal Board was subsidising the then water supply to the town, presumably its improvement, because it was the largest amount the Board spent on the town. It is to be noted that this provision was not made by the local authority, emphasising how Mt Mulligan was a "company township".
It would be useful if Rod Milne had given a source for his statement that rail motors were used on the line from time to time. A speed limit (30 mph) was declared for them. Returns in Annual Reports show one return trip by a rail motor in each of 1936-37 and 1937-38. These were traffic train miles, ie excluding empty running. If the car ran empty each way to provide a return service from Mt Mulligan there would have been an additional return trip each year. If, however, the rail motors were inwards trips, no empty running would have been needed. The same returns provide the information that these were the only years in the thirties that there was any rail motor mileage on the branch.
As the restriction on the supply of petrol during the war became known to the QR, it decided to decline certain rail motor excursions, one of which was from Mt Mulligan to Dimbulah (QR Secretary's file 47/371 in QSA). This was declined before it ran. This was almost certainly intended to use the Mareeba to Cairns rail motor, which ran to Cairns on alternate Sundays in 1940, and was thus available for guaranteed excursions on the other Sundays, many of which ran for football teams and supporters. In this case, it would appear that it was intended to run empty to Mt Mulligan to take the team and supporters or other travellers from there to Dimbulah or some other place.
Rod Milne does not state how he knew about a passenger train arriving at Mt Mulligan on a Sunday evening in 1936 (p 472), and of a train being held to cross the flooded Walsh River in the same year. I do. They were quoted in Interpretations (of the Railway Award) in QR Weekly Notices, and are correct. If he had given his sources, confidence could be placed in his material on these subjects.
Weekly Notice 26/36 refers in an Interpretation of the Railway Award to Dimbulah enginemen travelling passenger to Mareeba on Sunday 5th April 1936, and taking an excursion passenger train from there to Mt Mulligan, leaving Mareeba about 7 pm and signing off at 11.40 pm. This was almost certainly the return of a football special. Presumably the other Dimbulah crew had worked it in the opposite direction. The enginemen referred to could well have travelled passenger on the outbound version of the train they drove in the return direction. (This was the year before the two years with rail motor trips mentioned above.)
On p 472 it is said that "special hired excursion trains ran every so often to meet the needs of the coal miners… and their families". It would be useful to have a reference for this statement. I doubt it strongly. Who would have done the hiring? I think it likely that there were occasional special hired passenger trains, but that they ran (as in the 1936 case above) to meet the needs of the footballers, whether miners or not. There was a football competition among towns on the Tablelands. Trains and rail motors were hired to take teams and supporters to "away" games in other towns. Although Mt Mulligan was small, and its ability to take part probably restricted, such trains probably ran to and from the town each season.
Train Operating
Coal production is reported in calendar years, and QR traffic in financial years. It is nevertheless possible to obtain a satisfactory figure of the coal traffic by financial year by taking half of the calendar year coal production for each adjoining financial year.
The tonnage of the field divided by the return trips made on the line equals the average tons of coal per down train. While there are complications, of special trains for football, of the mixed trains at Christmas time which were mostly passenger trains, a clear picture emerges. Up to the disaster year of 1921 and from 1931-32 until the closure, the average net tonnage per train is 70. This is as expected. It allows for the heavier brake van and road wagon on the mixed and GWPA trains, a water truck when needed, the return of specialised wagons used for other traffic, as well as the non-coal carrying trains mentioned.
From 1921-22 until 1930-31, however, the average tons per train is 117, with a maximum of 139. It would seem that on average about two thirds of trains in that period were double headed. It is not obvious from the WTTs of the day how that occurred, but it would have been possible for the Chillagoe mixed to have had an attached engine each way between Mareeba and Dimbulah, for that engine to then double head the Mt Mulligan train, and vice versa. That would have provided extra capacity on the Chillagoe line trains for the coal moving east from Dimbulah to Mareeba and return of the empties. It also makes sense in the busiest years the line knew in terms of coal moved, those up to 1926, in saving the haulage of a brake van for some of the traffic to be moved, while providing just enough work for one guard at Dimbulah.
If this reasoning is correct, however, it is surprising that such working continued from 1927 onwards, when train numbers fell below four per week, and finally to only two in 1930-31, especially as by then the engine and crew at Dimbulah had capacity to work more trains on the branch, and to work to Mareeba themselves. Indeed, with the 1932 timetable, they ran to Mareeba twice per week.
From 1931-32, the train mileage figures are consistent with single engined trains, even during the secondary peak period of 1948-49 until closure.
Rod Milne includes in the composition of the mixed trains a couple of water wagons, a roadside wagon, car and van. As locomotive water was available at each end of the line until 1927 and after 1943, water would have been hauled for locomotive purposes only between 1927 and 1943, and at any time in other years when the supply at or near Mt Mulligan gave out. Water might have been hauled for an intermediate gang camp at 8½ miles (see above) or temporary camps at any intermediate location, but a truck for that would have been needed no more than once a fortnight.
I think Rod Milne can be assured (p 471) that there would not have been a separate van on trains on the line. As train loads on the line were so light, one vehicle, with space for first and second class passengers and with a compartment for guard, would have been provided, as on most branch line mixed trains throughout the State, a CV or CLV, and probably a light one, to maximise the ability to haul coal, something about 17 tons tare. Except at holiday times (see below) passenger numbers required no more. On trains run specifically to move coal, a light wagon brakevan, CB, CCB or CHB, would have been used.
Some of the traffics he suggests are not sensible. There was some mine machinery, when the State mine was mechanised and new equipment provided, fuel for generators in later years, but almost nothing for "local cattle properties beyond" as he claimed. Mt Mulligan was a dead end. It had no road to the outside world until 1951, when a road was formed to Dimbulah via Wolfram Camp (Mines Reports). There would have been precious few motor vehicles railed in during the whole life of the line, although the few around the township cannot have come by any other way. There was no local livestock industry, and apart from a few horses, no livestock were despatched from there (a rarity among rail termini in Queensland). No doubt some cattle were kept for local meat supply. Indeed, some livestock was possibly railed in for that reason. No road services were shown in the 1948 QR public timetable running from Mt Mulligan, which is a good indication that it did not serve places beyond. But the whole point is that even when about 100 were employed in two mines, only about 1800 tons were moved into the town, about 12 tons on each mixed train, probably all in a road wagon as Rod Milne mentions, occasionally in another wagon as well, especially fuel in drums postwar.
About Thornborough, he says on p 469 that the siding there lingered, of minimal use for local traffic, but useful no doubt for double trips from Mount Mulligan and stowing accumulated loading and empties. This is simply dreaming, about as nonsensical as the same author's idea that trains divided into Yugar on the Dayboro' branch. The engine loads were the same throughout the length of the branch, ie there was no intermediate point from which the load increased towards Dimbulah, so that it was not possible to increase through loads by bringing loading forward from Mt Mulligan and combining it there with that on a later train to take more on to Dimbulah. And it is not hard to see why. The summit of the climb from Mt Mulligan, and of the line, was near the 8½ miles, when Thornborough was at 17 miles (both from Dimbulah), and the hardest climb was on the approach to that summit. Further, there was a steep gradient from the Walsh River bridge into Dimbulah.
Because it was the only intermediate siding en route, that at Thornborough was no doubt used to detach from trains any vehicles which had developed problems en route. No doubt too, drivers of engines which developed an ailment after leaving Mt Mulligan occasionally detached loading there to ensure that they achieved the climb to 8½ miles successfully. As that climb was the only one of any length in the down direction, it is very likely that any dividing of trains which occurred would have been on that climb, in which case the train would have divided to Dimbulah. (While Wolfram Siding existed near 6½ miles (until the twenties), it would have been used for such dividing.
There is further guesswork on p 473, but at least it is admitted. There is no way of knowing how common late running was, but I should think it was not especially common. The up mixed on the Chillagoe line was a limited load train, with no intermediate shunting before Mareeba, and could have been expected to keep good time, and therefore not delayed the connecting up Mt Mulligan train. The branch working was largely self contained, with loaded coal wagons left at Dimbulah for other trains to take in each direction.
Mt Mulligan Station
Mt Mulligan yard had a 35 (also given as 40) tons capacity wagon weighbridge. The turntable was 40 ft diameter, which limited locomotive power to B15Con and PB15 classes. There were no livestock yards, and no crane.
The reports of the mine disaster in 1921 say that the goods shed acted as a mortuary. Lists of facilities at stations show Mt Mulligan to have had no goods shed up to 1950. Then WN23/52 notified the provision of a goods shed. It would be interesting to know how inwards goods traffic was handled at Mt Mulligan prior to the provision of the goods shed. Mt Mulligan closed as a station on 13th December 1957, two months after the State Mine, and was thereafter an isolated siding.
The reader is told on p 470 that Mt Mulligan would have been a hectic little place, especially in comparison with other stations in the Fifth class. This is not explained. Despite the statements on p 470 that work on train days was hard, and that "it would have been a big job in later years putting together the loading for the train to Dimbulah", it was almost certainly not. It was probably an easy post for the Station Master. The mines loaded coal themselves and moved the wagons as necessary at their loading points. Only two movements were needed with the engine at each mine - pulling out the loaded wagons, and placing the empties. I do not know how the King Cole Siding was dealt with, but the loaded wagons would certainly have been taken to Mt Mulligan for weighing. (There was a weighbridge at the Tableland Tin Siding at Mt Garnet, the destination of coal from King Cole, but the QR was unlikely to accept the measure of the customer for the weight of the coal hauled.) The siding was probably therefore dealt with by up trains, although special movements might have been run from Mt Mulligan and return. However it was dealt with, all the work fell to the guard, with assistance from the fireman.
The trains were so light that even ensuring the coal wagons were weighed and their numbers taken, the train was coupled up and the brake made (all jobs for the guard) were modest tasks compared with places where longer trains were dealt with (see traffic and train loads below). The movement of the wagons of general goods and their empty returns would have been the same as at most branch line termini. The traffic in supplies for the township was modest, about 2000 tons per year, much less in the years of low coal production. In later years, coal traffic was well below its peak. I would suggest that the job of the SM Mt Mulligan was an easy one. That is not to say that some were even easier. Many fifth class Station Masters were justified by safeworking, dealing with considerable traffic in passing trains, rather than the local goods traffic.
On p 470 appears the suggestion that the SM could take unofficial time off on non-train days. This is fatuous, especially when Rod Mine believes that there were a lot of coal specials. There were no non-train days in the WTTs of later years except on Sundays. He is easily impressed by tales of larrakin behaviour by QR staff, and regards a tale as history. The times of attendance by SMs at their station were laid down, and if they had reason to vary those hours, they had to advise authority, in this case the District Superintendent in Cairns. During the hours of attendance, the public could expect the SM to be at the station, to obtain their goods and obtain information. So could the managers and officials at the mines. In addition, the DS's office might want to reach him by telephone. In any case, it is not clear why the SM should have wanted to take unofficial time off - most people, and most SMs, did their jobs conscientiously. Where trains were infrequent, and customers few, there were many periods at many stations where staff were not fully occupied, despite make-work tasks like sweeping, window cleaning, even gardening.
Finances
After the QR took over the operation of the branch from Chillagoe Limited in 1919, it was a substantial loss maker by the criteria the QR employed to assess the finances of branch lines. The whole of the operating costs for the branch were debited to it, including the cost of hauling QR coal. But no revenue was credited for the haulage of QR coal. As that was the largest single item of traffic, it is not surprising that in the twenties and thirties, until this analysis was no longer published, the working expenses were about four times the revenue, even more some years. The working expenses exclude any depreciation and interest on capital. The declared losses therefore understate the losses to the QR. See also the report of the State Transport Commission in 1939 on loss making branch lines.
The train mileage declared in returns in the QR Annual Reports for the branch seems to have been stated in full. On the QR, traffic train miles were those run for public, paying traffic. Trains run by the QR for its own purposes, to carry its own traffic or to take empty carriages to the point where public traffic commenced, were referred to as departmental, and their mileage given separately. Where trains which were run for public traffic also conveyed departmental traffic such as locomotive coal, the mileage was "equated", ie the mileage was divided in proportion public to departmental in accordance with the tonnage of each, so far as I can see the gross tonnage. As over half the tonnage on the Mt Mulligan branch was QR coal, the actual train mileage should have been more than halved before declaration of the traffic train miles. But that seems not to have been done. It is possible to reach that conclusion because the total output of the field divided by the declared train miles comes close to giving a full net train load for the branch for each train run, after allowing for the wagons needed for the inwards traffic (see Traffic above and Locomotives below). The public traffic alone divided into the declared train mileage gives absurdly low net train loads.
The same seems to have applied on the Cooyar and Killarney branches, on which locomotive coal was a significant proportion of the traffic, and to sleeper traffic on the Mt Garnet line.
But prosperity did not apply to the branch, and that would have been the case even if the QR had paid normal freight on its own traffic. The train loads were so low, the quantity of coal moved per train so low, that the line was a substantial loss maker.
Locomotive Water Facilities
The WTTs show that locomotive water was available at 27 miles 23 chains until 1925. From 1927 until 1943, there was no water facility on the branch. From 1944 onwards water was available at Mt Mulligan yard.
Locomotives and Loads
Until 1919, the line was operated by Chillagoe Railway B15s. The first loads to be given in WTTs for the line appeared in 1920. These were for the Y class 110 tons, for a B15 with 120 lbs pressure 120 tons, and for a B15 with 140 lbs, 140, in all cases the same for both directions. (The Y class were engines of South Australian design which were taken over with the Chillagoe Railway). From 1922, the only load given was for B15 with 140 lbs pressure, 140 up and down.
The load for a B15 with 140 lbs pressure gradually became irrelevant, because Cairns Railway B15s were progressively rebuilt to B15 Converteds with 160 lbs pressure. By 1923, of the 24 engines of the B15 and its converted variant on the Cairns Railway, 14 were converted. The proportion rose with the years, and after 1929, of 26 of both, 23 were converted. The last three unconverted engines on the Cairns Railway ceased to run in 1934. But until 1936, the WTTs continued to give loads for B15s with 140 lbs pressure only. Only in the 1936 WTT was it acknowledged that B15 loads applied to B15 Converteds.
In 1939 there was a wholesale revision of loads on the branch. Loads were declared for B13s, 80 tons up and 115 down, the first time a load was declared for that class on the line. This was largely a dead letter, because there was then only one B13 on Cairns Railway and it was withdrawn that year. Loads for B13s were never given again. The load for B15Cons was altered to 125 up and 165 down, ie the up load was reduced by 15 tons, and the down increased by 25. And for the first time, a load was given for PB15s 110 up and 150 down. These loads were then unaltered until the line closed.
Rod Milne surmises that PB15s were the motive power. He can be informed that throughout the life of the line, most of the trains were hauled by B15 or B15 Converted engines, probably most by B15 Converteds. There are two reasons. One is the initial absence and later small numbers of PB15s on the Cairns Railway. There were none until 1927, and the few there were after that were used predominately on passenger trains. Even as late as 1942, there were only four, against 23 B15Cons. From the late 1940s, the B15Cons were gradually written off and more PB15s sent to the Cairns Railway. Only in 1951 did the number of PB15s exceed that of B15Cons. Even when the line closed, ten B15Cons were allocated to the Cairns Railway. Loads were not given for PB15s from Cairns to Mareeba until 1931, for the main line of the Chillagoe Railway to Mungana not until in 1934, and not until 1939 for the Mt Mulligan line.
The second reason is that the load for a B15Con was higher than that for a PB15, as above. The same applied on all the lines inland from Cairns, which is why the B15Cons were allotted there in such large numbers, and lasted there so long.
The load in the down direction was therefore always rather more than the "little more than a hundred tons" given by Rod Milne on p 471. Does he never consult even the most obvious references? Low as these loads were, on a purely coal train, after a 10 tons brake van, a B15Con could bring 155 tons gross of coal wagons, or 100 tons or so net of coal. On the mixed with a heavier (say 17 tons) brake van and a largely empty goods wagon, there was still capacity for 85 tons gross of coal wagons.
On p 472, he identifies at least two PB15s which ran on the line. Engines were not allotted to particular lines, but to the Cairns district. Every B15Con and PB15 allotted to that district during the years the Mt Mulligan branch was open must have run on the line.
On p 472 the author states that the small engines used struggled up and down this track doing a noble job in tough conditions. I am very aware of the hard work done by the smaller QR engines, but only a modest proportion of the 60 miles round trip from Dimbulah to Mt Mulligan required very hard work from the engine. In the up direction, as happened on many lines, the load was set by a few relatively short hard sections. See the description of the line. The up load was based on 1 in 36, set by the short consecutive 1 in 33s and 44s very close to Mt Mulligan. The rest of the run entailed moving the same load on much easier gradients.
The down load of 165 tons for a B15Con was based a gradient of 1 in 44. In that direction, the hardest bank was for 2¾ miles to the summit of the line at 8½ miles, and it averaged 1 in 64. On that, the steepest was 1 in 49½ for 16 chains, all straight. A section of 19 chs of 1 in 49½ on 15 chs radius curve at the 20 miles appears to have been the next hardest section in the down direction. There were nine chains of the ruling 1 in 44 at 18½ miles. On the rest of the run, the engines were not worked especially hard.
A return run from Dimbulah to Mt Mulligan as a shift would have been relatively easy, with the load light for the majority of the distance. The engines were small, and no shunts and few stops were normally required en route. Most trains were allowed two hours for the 30 miles, the mixeds and GWPAs a little more to allow for roadside work at intermediate places. This was not difficult within an 18 mph speed limit. But some trains were allowed as little as 100 minutes, exactly 18 mph.
The main problem faced by an engine crew was the Mt Mulligan coal. This was good for steam generation, but if then fire was allowed to cool, it clinkered badly, so much so that if an engine was to be stationary for a time, it was usual to dispose of the fire, and relight it before work was resumed.
The references on p 472 to the DL diesel mechanical and 1500/1170 class diesel electric locomotives are posturing padding, completely irrelevant to the history of the Mt Mulligan line. Rod Milne refers to the DLs in the plural being introduced in 1938. The first entered service in 1939, a second in 1954, and the remaining two in 1961 after the Mt Mulligan line had closed. They were built for the extremely light Etheridge line. Loads were issued for other lines only when there were four of them, and some were sometimes not needed for the Etheridge line.
It is hard to see what is ironic about the introduction of the 1500/1170 class DELs as the Mt Mulligan line wound down, as seen by Rod Milne. It is true that the track and bridges could have carried them, but the sharpest curves would have required double spiking. The two can be connected by date, but given the much busier lines on which these DELs could be usefully used, there was no prospect they would have been used on the Mt Mulligan line - compare other lines limited to the B15 classes at the time. They were not allowed on the Cairns Range until some moderate strengthening was done to the track and a little to the bridges in 1960, well after the Mt Mulligan line had closed.
The End of the Mines and the Closure of the Line
In January 1956, the cliff face above the entrance to the King Cole Mine collapsed, and destroyed the water line into the mine. Part of the mine was closed. The rock mass continued to move, the face over the mine portal became dangerous, and the mine was closed on the recommendations of the Mines Inspector. Production ceased on 23rd April 1957. Plant was salvaged, the owning company went into voluntary liquidation and the 19 staff moved to the State Mine. This was before the Mt Garnet operation went over to hydro electricity on 30th July. (see Appendix). Thus, for a few months the State Mine supplied all Mt Garnet coal requirements.
The State Mine still had the QR market. The new Nicklin government which came to power on 12th August 1957, did not look favourably on loss making government enterprises, especially those with a high degree of labour unrest (a 49 days strike in 1949, that after the long 1948 industry wide srike). Not long after it came to power, overheating was detected at the working face at this mine. An inspector found subsidence had opened cracks to abandoned areas at a lower level, and that limited oxygen had led to spontaneous combustion. Closure of the mine was ordered. The problem was not insuperable, but the mine was loss making, and curing the problem was not considered justified. Production ceased on 25th October 1957. In view of the low quality of the coal, the QR almost certainly did not demur. Even if it had not closed in 1957, the mine would have closed as the Cairns hinterland railways went over to diesel operation in the 1960s. And if there had been no diesels, its life would have been short, because it was found in the 1950s that the reserves of coal were modest.
Reclaimable plant was removed, and the entrances sealed on 15th November. The plant and those parts of the town which were government property were railed to Collinsville, where there was another State mine. The mine owned two miles of rails from its tramways/skipways. It is not known where these ended up. Employees were assisted to move to Collinsville, and most did. The business community was removed to Cairns at State expense. In May 1958 the remaining plant was auctioned and the railway wagon weighbridge removed to the State Mine at Ogmore, south of Mackay (CCM May 1958). Buildings in the town had been removed or sold for removal. Only two cottages and the hospital remained at the end of 1958.
In April 1958, 250,000 tons of sandstone fell from the escarpment into the gorge, tilted from stability by the workings at King Cole.
In his report for 1958-59, the Auditor-General summarised the finances of the State Mine. No purchaser could be found for 1093 tons of coal on hand at the closure (not even the QR!). The total of losses in capital written off, operating losses over the years and the cost of transferring people to Collinsville amounted to just under £700,000.
So the sequence of events was - King Cole closed on safety grounds, the tin dredge at Mt Garnet went over to hydro electricity, leaving the QR at Mareeba as the only market (although at 12,000 or so tons per year, not inconsiderable) for Mt Mulligan (State Mine) coal. The State Mine was then closed on safety grounds, and the Mt Mulligan branch closed as soon as the mining equipment was shipped out, coal for the QR at Mareeba then being supplied from Collinsville. The Mt Garnet branch lived on with meagre traffic until 1961. Compare this sequence and reasons, obtained from Mines Department reports, with different tales which appeared in Sunshine Express October 1974 p 224, and ARHS Bulletin August 1997 (History of the Mt Garnet branch). In these accounts, the closure is accounted for by the changeover to hydro-electricity at Mt Garnet, with the Mt Garnet tin dredge regarded as the only customer for Mt Mulligan coal, not taking into account that the QR was an even bigger customer, and might have continued to be one for a few years longer but for the problems in the State Mine.
Following the end of production on 25th October 1957, Mt Mulligan was closed as a station on 13th December, after which it was an isolated siding. Trains ran thereafter solely to carry out buildings, machinery and personal effects. The line was closed from 1st July 1958. There was a little traffic in 1958-59 after closure, as above
Lifting the line commenced on 5th January 1959, and by 30th June 1959, had been lifted back to 16 miles 15 chs (1959 QR Annual Report). It was mentioned at the QR Commissioner's Committee Meeting in February 1958 that under the provisions of the Railways Acts, certain accommodation works had to be preserved. These were to allow access across the line by adjacent landowners, and presumably were nothing more than level crossings of the formation.
The Lands Department proposed to dedicate the land and formation of the former railway as a road. The Mareeba Shire refused responsibility for building and maintaining a road, which is not surprising as there was now no township to serve, and it had already formed a road on a different route only a few years before. The land was then absorbed into adjacent pastoral holdings.
Other
(i) Small Accidents
Rod Milne claims, again as guesswork, and padding, that there could have been small derailments fixed up by the fettling gangs and (train) crews without ever being referred to head office. What could have happened is not what did happen, and is not history.
Rod Milne overlooks various things. One derailment indicates the potential for another, by the same vehicle or on the same piece of track, a potential danger, something which train crews in particular wished to guard against. A derailment often damages something, on the vehicle or track, which someone else can see, and possibly ask about. The damage might not be visible, which raises the potential for danger. It is not always easy to dream up a consistent set of explanations by all concerned which can hide the damage or the cause.
Whatever Rod Milne thinks, there is a limit to how much most railway staff were willing to take the rap for not having reported something which happened to cover the carelessness of others, even fellow railwaymen. In addition, derailments are not always easily dealt with. QR staff were not willing to work overtime for nothing, nor to find some way of avoiding disclosure of late running, just to avoid reporting a derailment. Last of all, non-railwaymen were often concerned about railway safety and might themselves report incidents to the management, or the police, or newspapers, even in out-of-the-way places like Mt Mulligan. For all these reasons, railwaymen reported incidents even when they were easily fixed or apparently easily covered up. In fact, they almost certainly reported events which, on examination, did not result in damage, and for which no blame could be attached to themselves, even when they did fix it..
Unless he had actual evidence of such incidents, specially related to the Mt Mulligan line, it was irresponsible to have raised this point as if it were history, and especially history of this branch.
(ii) Traffic and the RRR at Dimbulah
Rod Milne says on p 469 that Dimbulah generated considerable traffic in the tobacco season when that output was railed out. It would be useful if he were to substantiate this claim, because Dimbulah did not generate much outwards agricultural traffic at all. I wonder too if he can say how much sand ballast was forwarded from the ballast siding at the Walsh River, or is this another guess?
On p 474, the author says that "when the branch line was working, a refreshment room worked at Dimbulah station to provide sustenance for branch line passengers awaiting the M train to the branch. The main function of the refreshment rooms at Dimbulah was to provide lunch for the mixed train on the Chillagoe line, up three days per week, down another three. They long outlasted the closure of the Mt Mulligan branch, last appearing in the 1970 public timetable. Of course, they served branch passengers as well.
Appendix: The Mt Garnet Coal Traffic
Referring to the Mt Garnet line, Rod Milne tells the reader on p 472 that "although the timetable indicated a meagre regular timetable (sic), many extras would have worked to clear coal loading at busier times. Indeed, the war years of the 1940s saw many special trains working with coal …..to Tableland Tin at Mount Garnet…. From 1938 on, when the Tableland Tin premises opened at Mt Garnet, the line enjoyed prosperous times indeed with many coal extras." No authority is given for these statements. They are guesswork, and not right. And the use of the word "prosperous" to describe the traffic and its movement is an abuse of the language, for it is the opposite of the words which properly describe the traffic. More detail is given on traffic below, but Tableland Tin did not use a great deal of coal until towards the end of the war (it consumed a lot of firewood in its early years) and the quantity railed in to its siding was reduced when its dredge sank, and later when the dredge was relocated.
In 1938, a special rate was offered for coal from Mt Mulligan to Mt Garnet, initially at 12/8 per ton, the reason being "to assist industry". That rate must have been too high, because only five months later, a further special rate of 8/- per ton was offered. In June 1952, a special rate of £1/4/- per ton was provided by the QR for coal from Mt Mulligan (either mine therefore) to the Tableland Tin siding on the Mt Garnet line. In that period of rapid inflation, this no doubt replaced the 1938 special rate, or a later one. At such low rates, and with the high cost per ton of hauling it in very light trains, there was no prosperity.
The coal traffic from Mt Mulligan to Tableland Tin at Mt Garnet operated over a period of 14 years, that is for only a third of the life of the Mt Mulligan line, and for two of those years was very low on account of the tin dredge not working.
The total output of coal from the two mines at Mt Mulligan during the years coal moved to Mt Garnet was never more than two-thirds the output of the years of maximum production of the State Mine in the mid 1920s. During the years coal moved to Mt Garnet, the maximum number of trains on the Mt Mulligan line, as financial year averages, reached a maximum of 8.2 per week, only two more than the number of trains scheduled in the 1949 WTT to run regularly. There were therefore extras on the Mt Mulligan line, but not many. And 8.2 trains per week on the Mt Mulligan line was well within the capacity of the engine and crew stationed at Dimbulah. On the Mt Garnet line, only one mixed train per week was advertised, so the coal movement resulted in a lot more trains on that line, although most were shown in the WTT. And of those shown as running regularly, two were shown in the WTT as connecting at Lappa with the through mixed on the Chillagoe line, and one watered gang camps between Dimbulah and Mt Garnet.
The following comes from Wardens’ reports. In 1939, the Tableland Tin dredge near Mt Garnet ceased work for three months so that the operations could be converted from steam power to electricity, the electricity to be generated in a fixed power house (which also supplied the town). In 1941 it was fuelled by wood and coal. In February 1942 the dredge capsized in a flood and was a total loss. A new dredge had been under construction, and came into use in 1943, about the time King Cole mine opened at Mt Mulligan, but lost four weeks of operation at the end of the year on account of lack of water! A closure for the same reason occurred in November 1945. The tin content of the site having been exhausted, operations ceased for the first ten months of 1952 to shift the dredge to a new site.
The power house for the dredge ceased to operate on 30th July 1957, after which electricity generated by hydro power at Tully Falls was purchased from the Cairns Regional Electricity Board. This was two months after the King Cole coal mine at Mt Mulligan closed, but three months before the State Mine there closed. Apart from the use of stocks on hand at either the Mt Garnet power house or King Cole Mine, the State Mine must have supplied Mt Garnet at the very end, and the only market for the last three months of the State Mine was the QR.
In the traffic returns in QR Annual Reports, the inwards tonnage at Mt Garnet received an upwards boost in 1943-4 from coal traffic, with the opening of the new dredge there and King Cole mine at Mt Mulligan. From 1945-46, the Tableland Tin siding at 31½ miles on the Mt Garnet branch is shown separately in those traffic returns. The inward traffic is not necessarily all coal. It included whatever the company had railed in, and could even have included some firewood. It was 8305 tons that year, averaged 10,140 tons per year up to and including 1956-57, or 10,750 per year after allowing for the year when the dredge did not operate. The maximum in any one year was 13,667 in 1956-57.
Virtually all the output of King Cole reported in Wardens’ reports was railed out as public traffic. Apart from three years about 1951, the tonnage from King Cole is well below the tonnage railed into 31½ miles siding near Mt Garnet (not necessarily all coal), over 12 years only 72% of it. It seems that in most years that this traffic moved, the State Mine supplied some of the coal. The maximum output of King Cole occurred in 1951, 12,231 tons.
From 1943-44 until 1956-57, the train miles on the Mt Garnet branch closely followed the tonnage received at that siding. In 1939-40, there were 99 round trips on the branch, roughly two per week, and in 1949-50 350, ie a trip almost every day. And that is what the 1949 WTT provided for - one mixed and six goods trains per week, with an engine and crew overnight at Mt Garnet on three nights of the week and two such on two other nights. The maximum number of trains in a year to Mt Garnet was 451 in 1954-55, and the second highest 406 in 1956-57. The average over the nine years 1948-49 to 1956-7 was 339. The 1954-55 figure represents three trains every two working days (ie excluding Sundays and public holidays). This was considerably busier than many QR branch lines in terms of the number of trains, but there were busier. Many branches dealt with greater tonnages in many fewer trains, because the loads on them were heavier per train, partly because many were able to take heavier locomotives, partly because many were less severely graded.
The coal traffic for Mt Garnet was operated from Mareeba. The trains brought empty coal wagons and any other traffic available from Mareeba to Dimbulah, then attached loaded coal wagons there for Tableland Tin (31½ miles) siding, to the maximum load for the Mt Garnet line of 120 tons for a B15 Converted or 105 tons for a PB15. Each train required a TW water gin (10 tons gross) and a 10 tons brake van. After the tare of the wagons, allowing for the coal to be hauled in open wagons or hoppers, the maximum net load was 50 tons for a PB15 and 60 tons for a B15Con. Although traffic into 31½ miles dominated the public traffic on the branch, in and out, from 1943-44 until 1956-57, the average inwards tonnage per round trip was generally only about 38 tons. There are several reasons for that low figure: specialised wagons had to be hauled out empty for some of the return traffic, certainly for the modest traffic in livestock and public and QR traffic in timber, for each round trip, about two tons net of coal had to be hauled out to top up the tender of the engine before return, and water was hauled for the gangs.
The train detached the coal at the company siding at 31½ miles and proceeded to Mt Garnet for the crew to book off, and return next day. About 35 minutes seems to have been allowed up and 15 down at the 31½ miles to detach and attach, and for the engine to take water. The QR bought locomotive water from Tableland Tin, installing a tank and jib in 1943, and bought about 3000 gallons per trip (about the capacity of a PB15 tender and a TW gin; prior to this supply being available, two gins were hauled on every train to Mt Garnet). After the supply at Tableland Tin became available, but before the tank and jib were installed, low capacity arrangements meant it took 45 minutes to fill that amount of water).
This meant 177 miles of running and two crew shifts to move the very modest 50 to 60 tons of coal 61 miles from Dimbulah to 31½ miles (plus some more coal for the QR on the return from Dimbulah to Mareeba). In 1947-48, the revenue per ton for coal from King Cole mine was £0.76 per ton, and for all traffic in at 31½ miles was £0.79, thus about two old pence per ton per mile.
In ARHS Bulletin 728, June 1998, Rod Milne commented on an article on the Mt Garnet line by John Kerr in the August 1997 number of that Bulletin. He made the claim there also that between 1938 and 1957 was a very hectic time, and that Mt Garnet was one of the more prosperous branch termini on the system. He says that in the busy war years, "you could get two trains a day, as one or two old train notices I have come across suggested" (no reference to the notices). While that no doubt happened on particular days, the frequency throughout the year did not approach one per working day during the war years. It exceeded one only in 1946-47 (see above for the busiest years).
He claimed that Mt Garnet yard must have been a tough little yard to work when coal traffic was busy in the rather hectic period 1938 to 1957. That statement is silly because the coal traffic was all handled at the Tableland Tin siding and did not come to Mt Garnet yard, and because the traffic handled at Mt Garnet itself was very modest. He considered the level of traffic after the coal ceased up to closure of the line in 1961 as reasonable. The total of public traffic from all stations on the branch in and out in 1959-60, including livestock, was only a little over 100 tons per week, 78 tons in the busier direction (outwards).
After the coal traffic ceased in 1957, train mileage on the Mt Garnet line remained relatively high, at four, three and six trains per week for the three financial years up to 1959-60. After allowing for the modest quantity of livestock, the large train mileage was operated to move only some 14 tons of public traffic per round trip. A large quantity of QR traffic must have been moving to fill those trains. It seems that there was indeed traffic in timber for the QR to fill all those trains.
The hint for that comes in a note and photographs in Sunshine Express for February 2005 pp 321-2. A burnt out bridge collapsed under a down train on the branch in October 1959. In the consist were two H wagons of sleepers and one S of logs. The logs could have been QR traffic as well as the sleepers, for bridge timbers or telegraph poles. There had always been public timber traffic on the branch, as much as 1212 tons in 1959-60, but mostly a good bit less. And in his letter in ARHS Bulletin in June 1998, Rod Milne mentions the timber gantry in Mt Garnet Yard. As that was not included in the facilities there in a list of 1950, it must have been provided only in the fifties. How much QR traffic in timber there was before the coal traffic ceased is not known, but it cannot have been anywhere near as much as in the last three years, or the train numbers would have been insufficient to move it.
It is surprising, considering the far inland location of the Mt Garnet power house, that it was still burning coal so late. Diesel powered generators had been provided by then to both Mt Mulligan town and the State Mine there, themselves relatively late.
On p 468, Rod Milne says that the junction arrangements for the Mt Mulligan line at Dimbulah, ie with the points facing Chillagoe, suited perfectly for traffic purposes. The mine was opened up and the line built to supply Chillagoe smelters, especially with coke. But the coal proved unsuited to coking, and the market to the west was limited to small amounts for Irvinebank and Chillagoe until the late 1930s, when the traffic to Tableland Tin near Mt Garnet started, a traffic not envisaged when the line was planned. By far the biggest customer over the life of the line was the QR. That coal reversed direction at Dimbulah to go east, apart from modest amounts sent west to top up tenders of engines working that way, mostly to Alma-den.
Major Sources
Peter Bell: If Anything Too Safe, The Mt Mulligan Coal Mine Disaster of 1921, James Cook University of North Queensland 1996. This gives the history of the mine from its inception, and after the 1921 disaster, as well as information on the town.
Report of the Royal Commission … Mt Mulligan Coal Mine Disaster, QPP 1922, Vol 2, p 709, which includes the history of the mine up to that date.
Annual Reports of the Department of Mines, which includes reports of Mining Wardens and Mines Inspectors, and at times of the Manager of the State Mine. These therefore include the history of the coal mining at Mt Mulligan, both the State Mine and the private King Cole Mine, and of the tin dredging at Mt Garnet, a major user of Mt Mulligan coal.
R L Whitmore: Coal in Queensland, 3rd vol, Federation to the Twenties
Queensland Railways, Working Plan and Section of the Line, Working and Public Time Tables, Annual Reports, and files, separately noted in the text as appropriate.
John Kerr, The Mt Garnet Branch, ARHS Bulletin, August 1997.
Author's Note
Despite the consultation of original sources and contemporary statistics, fine points on the history of this line are not available, and the author will be interested in hearing of any information which allows such points to be addressed.
12th February 2008