In 1864 at a critical moment in the American Civil War, General John B. Hood was given charge of the Army of Tennessee, formally commanded by Joseph E.Johnston. Hood then became General Patrick Ronayne Cleburne's last commander. In his autobiography, "Advance and Retreat", Hood describes the events leading up to Cleburne's death.
General Johnston, touching the operations of his Army near New Hope Church says:*
"We found, next morning, that the Federal line extended much further to our right than it had done the day before. Polk's Corps was transferred to the right of Hood's. * * * The Federal troops extended their entrenched lines so rapidly to their left, that it was found necessary in the morning of the 27th to transfer Cleburne's Division of Hardee's Corps to our right, where it was formed on the prolongation of Polk's line.
Keny's Cavalry, composed of, Allen's and Hannon's Alabama brigades, together less than a thousand (1000) men, occupied the interval. of half-a-mile, between Cleburne's right and Little Pumpkinvine creek. * * * * Between 5 and 6 o'clock in the afternoon. Kelly's skirmishers were driven in by a body of Federal cavalry, whose advance was supported by the Fourth Corps.* * * * As soon as the noise of this contest revealed to Major General Cleburne the manoeuvre to turn his right, he brought the right brigade of his second line, Granberry's, to Kelly's support, by forming it on the right of his first line. * * * The Fourth Corps came on in deep order, and assailed the Texans with great vigor, receiving their close and accurate fire with the fortitude always exhibited by General Sherman's troops in the actions of this campaign. * * * The contest of the main body of the Fourth Corps with Granberry's brigade was a very fierce one. * * They (the enemy) left hundreds of corpses within twenty paces of the Confederate lines."
It is strange the author of this Narrative should offer the above, and, in fact, nearly all he has written later as a contribution to the historian, when he commits the unpardonable error of placing Polk's Corps during the whole of this " affair near New Hope Church" in the identical position occupied by my corps.
I was not only on the right, where he places Polk, but sent to him for a good division, with the message that Howard's Corps was moving rapidly to turn my right flank, which was the right of the infantry of our Army; that I had extended my lines as far as possible. He sent Cleburne's Division to report to me. General Cleburne was given by me most explicit instructions in regard to the formation of his forces on the right of my corps. He was directed to place his troops in a column of brigades, in the rear of my immediate right, which was the right of Hindman's Division, with Granberry's brigade in rear of the column, so as to bring it on our extreme right when deployed into line; he was also instructed to allow the Federal cavalry to reconnoiter and find our right. Similar orders were given to our own cavalry. As Howard's Corps advanced, Cleburne was directed to deploy quickly into line; the Federals thus came in contact with a solid line of infantry, in lieu of finding the open space on our flank, which existed at the time of the reconnaissance of the Federal cavalry.
I shall ever remember the enthusiasm and transport of the gallant Cleburne at the time of this though small engagement, yet most brilliant affair of the whole campaign.
The proof of the correctness of my statement respecting the above operations will be found in the following extract from a short report, written at my dictation by a young officer of my staff, and which, as it conflicts with General Johnston's own narrative, is unaccountably inserted by him.
"On the morning of the 26th, the enemy found to be extending their left. Hindman's Division was withdrawn from my left, and placed in position on my right, the enemy continuing to extend his left. Major General Cleburne, with his division, was ordered to report to me, and was massed on Hindman's right. On the morning of the 27th, the enemy known to be extending rapidly to the left, attempting to turn my right as they extended. Cleburne was deployed to meet them, and, at half-past 5. p m., a very stubborn attack was made on his division, extending to the right, where Major General Wheeler, with his cavalry, dismounted, was engaging them. The assault was continued with great determination upon both Cleburne and Wheeler until after night, but every attempt to break their lines was gallantly repulsed. About 10 o'clock at night, Brigadier General Granberry, with his brigade of Texans made a dashing charge on the enemy, driving them from the field, their killed and wounded being left in our hands. During this engagement, two or three hundred prisoners were captured, all belonging to Howard's Corps."
At the end of this hastily written field report I add,
" I enclose Major General Cleburne's report, and will forward others as soon as received."
Every soldier of and above the rank of captain knows that no officer sends forward his reports of battle, save through his commanding officer at the time of the engagement. Therefore General Cleburne brought his report of this "affair" to me, who commanded him at the time, in lieu of forwarding it through Lieutenant General Hardee to whose corps he was attached. Again, in reference to operations near New Hope Church, the author of this remarkable Narrative writes as follows,
When the three Lieutenant Generals were together in my quarters that day (the 28th), as usual, Lieutenant General Hood suggested that we should make an attack upon the Federal Army, to commence on its left flank. The suggestion was accepted, and the three officers were desired to be ready for battle next morning. Lieutenant General Hood was instructed to draw his corps out of the line to the rear, and to march during the night around our right, and form it facing the enemy's left flank, somewhat obliquely to his line, and to assail that flank at dawn next day. Polk and Hardee were instructed to join in the battle successively, obliquely to the present formation, when the progress made on the right of each should enable him to do so.
We waited next morning for the signal agreed upon-the musketry of Hood's Corps-from the appointed time until about 10 a.m., when a message from the Lieutenant General was delivered to me by one of his aides-de-camp, to the effect that he had found Johnston's Division on the Federal left, thrown back almost at right angles to the general, on the Federal line, and entrenching; that, under such circumstances, he had thought it inexpedient to attack, and asked for instructions. I supposed, from the terms of this message, that Hood's Corps was in the presence of the enemy, and that, his movement and position being known to them. they would be prepared to repel his assault as soon as he could make it, after his aide-de-camp's return. If the attack had been expedient when Lieutenant General Hood's message was dispatched, the resulting delay, by enabling the enemy to reinforce the threatened point and complete the entrenchments began, made it no longer so. He was. therefore recalled.
Before I withdrew from the right of the Army which rested on Little Pumpkinvine creek, with Cleburne's Division still on my extreme right and under my orders-i:e, before I withdrew on the night of the 28th of May from the position General Johnston erroneously assigns General Polk during the 26th, 27th and 28th, I received information from General Wheeler's cavalry stationed on Cleburne's right, just across Little Pumpkinvine creek, that the enemy had its left flank beyond this stream, in a position which was exposed by reason of the difficulty of passage back to the main body of their Army; and that if could withdraw that night, the 28th, and get in position by early morning, I might attack this corps or division thus exposed, and destroy it before it could recross Little Pumpkinvine creek or receive reinforcements. This information reached me on the morning of the 28th, after Cleburne's repulse of the enemy on the afternoon and night of the 27th, as before mentioned.
When at Kennesaw Mountain, he ordered General Howard to use freely his artillery. saying: *
" I explained to him that we must keep up the morale of a bold offensive, that he must use his artillery, force the enemy to remain on the timid defensive."
Again, whilst still at Kennesaw, he says:
"On the 19th June the rebel Army again fell, back on its flanks, to. such extent that for a time I supposed it had retreated to the Chattahoochee river. * * * These successive contractions of the enemy's line encouraged us and discouraged him."
Sherman possessed sufficient judgment and soldiership to discern that the causes which improved his Army, impaired that of his antagonist; and his ground regarding the; bold offensive policy in opposition to the "timid defensive," together with his acknowledgment of the effect of breastworks upon raw troops, clearly proves that he did not favor the handling of troops according to the Joe Johnston school.
Lieutenant General S. D. Lee, who served a long period under General Lee, in Virginia, and who was assigned to the command of a corps around Atlanta shortly after I assumed the direction of the Army, remarks in his official report, of the offensive operations commencing at Palmetto, Georgia, September 29th, 1864. with reference to the morale of the troops during the operations around Atlanta:
"It was my observation and belief that the majority of the officers and men were so impressed with the idea of their inability to carry even temporary breastworks that, when orders were given to attack and there was a probability of encountering works, they regarded it as reckless in the extreme. Being impressed with these convictions, they did not generally move to the attack with that spirit which nearly always ensures success.' Whenever the enemy changed his position, temporary work, could be improvised in less than two hours, and he could never b, caught without them.
In making these observations, it is due to many gallant officers and commands to state that there were noticeable exceptions; but the feeling was so general that anything like a general attack was paralyzed by it. The Army having constantly yielded to the flank movements of the enemy, which he could make with but little difficulty, by reason of his having failed in the offensive movements vastly superior numbers, and prior to the fall of Atlanta, its efficiency for further retarding the progress of the enemy was much impaired; and, besides, the advantages in the topography of the country, south of Atlanta, were much more favorable to the enemy for the movements of his superior numbers than the rough and mountainous country already yielded to him."
Lieutenant General Lee's large experience in Virginia qualified him to form a correct opinion upon this subject; it should also be borne in mind that he assumed command of his Corps around Atlanta, on the 25th of July, immediately after the battles of the 20th and 22nd, which had already, in a degree, improved the morale of the Army, and which had the subsequent effect of arresting desertions almost entirely throughout the siege.
Notwithstanding my endeavors to explain satisfactorily to myself my inability to procure co-operative action upon the 20th, and 22nd, I remained somewhat perplexed upon the subject-especially in regard to the failure, on the 20th, of the best troops of the Army, Hardee's Corps. Shortly after the beginning of the siege, Major General Cleburne, commanding a division in that corps, called at my headquarters. The Occurrences of the hour were discussed, and, finally, the two late battles in which he had been a participant. Much was said pro and con, relative to the condition of the Army and the causes of failure in the above referred to engagements. I then unfolded to him the plans of action, together with the peremptory orders to halt at nothing on our side of Peach Tree creek.
Cleburne seemed surprised, and thereupon informed me that is his Division was about to move forward to the attack, on the 20th, General Hardee rode along the line, and, in the presence of those around him, cautioned him to be on the lookout for breastworks.
I can recall no reply on my part at the time, save, perhaps, some expression of astonishment. I could say nothing, even to so worthy a subordinate. He left me to infer, however, from subsequent remarks, that his Division would have taken quite a different action on the 20th, had it not been for, the forewarning of his corps commander.
I give the above narrative of facts with a full knowledge of my accountableness to the same Ruler before whom those two gallant soldiers have been summoned; and, as I avowed at the beginning of my task, would not have undertaken to write of these unpleasant subjects, were it not for the seeming perpetuation of injustice and misrepresentation in the guise of truth and history.
It is but reasonable to deduce from this unfortunate observation to Cleburne that General Hardee gave a similar warning to other officers. At all events, those who are able to realize the baneful effect of such a remark from the commander of a corps d'armee, upon the eve of conflict, know that his words were almost equivalent to an order to take no active part in the battle.
From the hour one of the main sources of our trouble was thus accidentally made known to me, I recognized that my power, upon any occasion, to deal quick and heavy blows to the enemy, would be greatly hampered, unless I could procure the relief of this officer and the appointment of one better qualified for the actual emergencies. Whilst General Hardee had, perhaps, no superior as a corps commander during retreat in presence of an enemy, or in defensive operations, he was wanting in that boldness requisite for offensive warfare. This his defect, which may be found in officers of undoubted courage and of every rank, was aggravated by the protracted "timid defensive" policy under my predecessor, and to this misfortune I attributed his non-observance of orders. Long and gallant service had, however, endeared him to his troops, and, because
I was confident that after Schofield had crossed the river and placed that obstruction between our respective Armies, he ,Would feel in security, and would remain in his position at least a sufficient length of time to allow me to throw pontoons across the river about three miles above his left flank, and, by a bold and rapid march together with heavy demonstrations in his front, gain his rear before he was fully apprised of my object.
The situation presented an occasion for one of those interesting and beautiful moves upon the chess-board of war, to perform which I had often desired an opportunity. As stated in a letter to General Longstreet, I urgently appealed for authority to turn the Federal left at Round Top Mountain. I had beheld with admiration the noble deeds and grand results achieved by the immortal Jackson in similar manoeuvres; I had seen his Corps made equal to ten times its number by a sudden attack on the enemy's rear, and I hoped in this instance to be able to profit by the teaching of my illustrious -Countryman. As I apprehended unnecessary and fatal delay might be occasioned by the appearance of the enemy on the line of march to the rear, I decided to bridge the river that night, and move at dawn the next morning with Cheatham's Corps-whose right was then resting near the point selected for a crossing-together with Stewart's Corps and Johnston's Division, of Lee's Corps, and to leave Lieutenant General Lee with Stevenson's and Clayton's Divisions and the bulk of the artillery, to demonstrate heavily against Schofield, and follow him if he retired.
Since I had attempted this same movement on the 22nd of July, and had been unable to secure its success,.I resolved to go in person at the head of the advance brigade, and lead the Army to Spring Hill.
Colonel Prestman and his assistants laid the pontoons during the night of the 28th, about three miles above Columbia; orders to move at dawn the following day having been issued to the t-mo corps and the division above mentioned, I rode with my staff to Cheatham's right, passed over the bridge soon after daybreak, and moved forward at the head of Granberry's Texas brigade, of Cleburne's Division, with instructions that the remaining corps and divisions follow, and at the same time keep well closed up during the march.
General Forrest had crossed the evening previous and moved to the front and right I threw forward a few skirmishers who advanced at as rapid a pace as I supposed the troops could possibly proceed.
During the march, the Federal cavalry appeared on the hills to our left; not a moment, however, was lost on that account, as the Army was marching by the right flank and was prepared to face at any instant in their direction. No attention, therefore, was paid to the enemy, save to throw out a few sharp-shooters in his front
. I well knew that to stop and lose time in reconnoitering would defeat my object, which was to reach the enemy's rear and cut him off from Nashville. I also knew that Schofield was occupied in his front, since I could distinctly hear the roar of Lee's artillery at Columbia, whilst a feint was made to cross the river.
Thus I led the main body of the Army to within about two ring miles and in full view of the pike from Columbia to SP 'Hill and Franklin. I here halted about 3 p. m., and requested General Cheatham, commanding the leading corps, and Major General Cleburne to advance to the spot where, sitting upon my horse, I had in sight the enemy s wagons and men passing at double-quick along the Franklin pike. As these officers approached, I spoke to Cheatham in the following words which I quote almost verbatim, as they have remained indelibly engraved upon my memory ever since that fatal day: " General, do you see the enemy there, retreating rapidly to escape us?" He answered in the affirmative. " Go," I continued, " with your Corps, take possession of and hold that pike at or near Spring Hill. Accept whatever comes, and turn all those wagons over to our side of the house." Then addressing Cleburne I Said, " General, you have beard the orders just given. You have one of my best divisions. Go with General Cheatham, assist him in every way you can, and do as he directs." Again,. as a parting injunction to them, I added, " Go and do this at once Stewart is near at hand, and I will have him double-quick his men to the front."
They immediately sent staff officers to hurry the men forward, and moved off with their troops at a quick pace in the direction of the enemy. I dispatched several of my staff to the rear, with orders to Stewart and Johnson to make all possible haste. Meantime I rode to one side, and looked on at Cleburne's Division, followed by the remainder of Cheatham's Corps, as it marched by seemingly ready for battle. Within about one-half hour from the time Cheatham left me, skirmishing began with the enemy, when I rode forward to a point nearer the pike, and again sent a staff officer to Stewart and Johnson to push forward. At the same time, I dispatched a messenger to General Cheatham to lose no time in gaining possession of the pike at Spring Hill. It was reported back that he was about to do so.
Listening attentively to the fire of the skirmishers in that direction, I discovered there was no continued roar of musketry, and being aware of the quick approach of darkness, after four o'clock at that season of the year, I became somewhat uneasy, and again ordered an officer to go to General Cheatham, inform him that his supports were very near at hand, that he must attack at once, if he had not already so done, and take and hold possession of the pike. Shortly afterwards, I entrusted another officer with the same message, and, if my memory is not treacherous, finally requested the Governor of Tennessee, Isham G. Harris, to hasten forward and impress upon Cheatham the importance of action without delay. I knew no large force of the enemy could be at Spring Hill, as couriers reported Schofield's main body still in front of Lee, at Columbia, up to a late hour in the day. I thought it probable that Cheatham had taken possession of Spring Hill without encountering, material opposition, or had formed line across the pike, north of the town, and entrenched
At early dawn the troops were put in motion in the direction of Franklin, marching as rapidly as possible to overtake the enemy before he crossed the Big Harpeth, eighteen miles from Spring Hill. Lieutenant General Lee had crossed Duck river after dark the night previous, and, in order to reach Franklin, was obliged to march a distance of thirty miles. The head of his column arrived at Spring Hill at 9 a. m. on the 30th, and, after a short rest, followed in the wake of the main body.
A sudden change in sentiment here took place among officers and men: the Army became metamorphosed, as it were, in one night. A general feeling of mortification and disappointment pervaded its ranks. The troops appeared to recognize that a rare opportunity had been totally disregarded, and manifested, seemingly, a determination to retrieve, if possible, the fearful blunder of the previous afternoon and night. The feeling existed which sometimes induces men who have long been wedded to but one policy to look beyond the sphere of their own convictions, and, at least, be willing to make trial of another course of action.
Stewart's Corps was first in order of march; Cheatham followed immediately, and Lieutenant General Lee in rear. Within about three miles of Franklin, the enemy was discovered on the ridge over which passes the turnpike. As soon as the Confederate troops began to deploy, and skirmishers were thrown forward, the Federals withdrew slowly to the environs of the town.
It was about 3 p.m. when Lieutenant General Stewart moved to the right of the pike and began to establish his position in front of the enemy. Major General Cheatham's Corps, as it arrived in turn, filed off to the left of the road, and was also disposed in line of battle. The artillery was instructed to take no part in the engagement, on account of the danger to which women and children in the village would be exposed. General Forrest was ordered to post cavalry on both flanks, and, if the assault proved successful, to complete the ruin of the enemy by capturing those who attempted to escape in the direction of Nashville. Lee's Corps, as it arrived, was held in reserve, owing to the lateness of the hour and my inability, consequently, to post it on the extreme left. Schofield's position was rendered favourable for defense by open ground in front, and temporary entrenchments which the Federals had time to throw up, notwithstanding the Confederate forces had marched in pursuit with all possible speed. At one or two points, along a short space, a slight abatis had been hastily constructed, by felling some small locust saplings in the vicinity.
Soon after Cheatham's Corps was massed on the left, Major General Cleburne came to me where I was seated on my horse in rear of the line, and asked permission to form his Division in two, or, if I remember correctly, three lines for the assault. I at once granted his request, stating that I desired the Federals to be driven into the river in their immediate rear and directing him to advise me as soon as he had completed the new disposition of his troops. Shortly afterward, Cheatham and Stewart reported all in readiness for action, and received orders to drive the enemy from his position into the river ,at all Hazards. About that time Cleburne returned, and, expressing himself with an enthusiasm which he had never before betrayed in our intercourse, said, "General, I am ready, and have more hope in the final success of our cause than I have had at any time since the first gun was fired. I replied, "God grant it!" He turned and moved at once toward the head of his Division; a few moments thereafter, he was lost to my sight in the tumult of battle. These last words, spoken to me by this brave and distinguished soldier, I have often recalled; they can never leave my memory, as within forty minutes after he had uttered them, he lay lifeless upon or near the breastworks of the foe.
The two corps advanced in battle array at about 4 p.m., and soon swept away the first line of the Federals, who were driven back upon the main line. At this moment, resounded a concentrated roar of musketry, which recalled to me some of the deadliest struggles in Virginia, and which now proclaimed that the possession of Nashville was once more dependent upon the fortunes of war. The conflict continued to rage with intense fury; our troops succeeded in breaking the main line at one or more points, capturing and turning some of the guns on their opponents.
Just at this critical moment of the battle, a brigade of the enemy, reported to have been Stanley's, gallantly charged, and restored the Federal line, capturing at the same time about one thousand of our troops within the entrenchments. Still the ground was obstinately contested, and, at several points upon the immediate. sides of the breastworks, the combatants endeavored to use the musket upon one another, by inverting and raising it perpendicularly, in order to fire; neither antagonist, at this juncture, was able to retreat without almost a certainty of death. It was reported that soldiers were even dragged from one side of the breastworks to the other by men reaching over hurriedly and seizing their enemy by the hair or the collar.
*HEADQUARTERS. ARMY OF TENNESSEE,
SIX MILES SOUTH OF NASHVILLE,
December 3rd, 1864.
HON. J. A. SEDDON,
Secretary of War, Richmond, Va.
SIR:-About 4 o'clock, p. m. we attacked the enemy at Franklin, and drove him from his outer line of temporary works into his interior lines, which he abandoned during the night, leaving his dead and wounded in our possession, and retreated rapidly to Nashville, closely pursued by our cavalry. We captured several stands of colors, and about one thousand prisoners. Our troops fought with great gallantry. We have to lament the loss of many gallant officers and brave men. Major General Cleburne, Brigadier Generals Gist, John Adams, Strahl, and Granberry were killed; Major General Brown ' Brigadier Generals Carter, Manigault, Quarles, Cockrell, and Scott were wounded, and Brigadier General Gordon captured.
(Signed) J. B. HOOD, General.