Great Britain is a country with a rich and varied, not to say violent, history spanning centuries and involving Kings and Queens, religions, foreign conquests and Empire, industrial revolution leading to global supremacy and world wars. The Britain of the twenty-first century is very different indeed. Britain is now a permanent member of the European Union. Its sovereign status since 1972, when Conservative Prime Minister Edward Heath signed the Treaty of Rome allowing for the first time a pooling of sovereignty with other sovereign states to coordinate economic issues, has fundamentally changed.
Scotland, and to a lesser extent Wales, has always seen itself as a nation with a distinct history and culture, with different education and legal systems from those of England and Wales. The film Braveheart romantically portrays Scotland as forever at war with a vile and brutal England. The reality is perhaps a little different. As Vernon Bogdanor argues, the loss of their parliament in 1707 after the Acts of Union were signed, committing Scotland to a United Kingdom, was not seen as a great loss. The Scottish Parliament did not until 1690 assume a dominant position in Scottish life, and was never a sovereign parliament but only one of a number of rivals competing for the exercise of power. Scottish nationality was to be secured by national institutions such as the legal system, the courts and the Scottish Church, the Kirk, and not by the Scottish parliament. So important were these institutions to nationhood that they were guaranteed in the Treaty. (Bogdanor, 1979, 75)
But why did Scotland accede to an English parliament? Bogdanor argues the reasons were economic and religious. Scotland would gain from having access to the expanding markets which England was enjoying with her colonies around the world, and would have a better chance of preserving Presbyterianism from the onslaught of Stuart and Catholic restoration. Most importantly the union meant peace with England. Lord Roxborough, a powerful nobleman who held the balance of power in the Scottish Parliament, said "if Union fail, War will never be avoided; and for my part the more I think of Union, the more I like it, seeing no security anywhere else." The Scots wanted to preserve their nationhood within the framework of a unitary state which would protect these institutions. To the Scottish people it was not an act of assimilation, but rather a statement of Scotland's unconquered nationhood. (Bogdanor, 1979, 75-77)
However the Union of Parliaments in 1707 was not popular with everyone within Scotland. In a powerful and unusual alliance between the Jacobites and radical Presbyterians, there were many dissenting voices against the treaty. Although many Scots believed that the Union with England would bring economic prosperity, others thought that they were "mortgaging their future to England." (Roxburgh, 2001, 201) Within the Church of Scotland, there was apprehension that the hierarchy of the Church of England would exert undue influence on spiritual matters. Thomas Boston, in his final sermon in 1707, urged his parishioners to continue in their opposition "against popery, prelacy, superstition and ceromonies. And mourn for this, that by the union, a nail is sent from Scotland, to fix the Dragon of the English hierarchy in its place in our country." Boston was seen as being representative of many people within the Church of Scotland at the time who opposed the Union. One of his parishioners wrote, "confederacy with such a deceitful and cunning people, who would, if it lay in their power, ruin all their neighbour nations, to advance their own interest. … for they would ruin our State, would also ruin our Church." (Roxburgh, 2001, 202)
These then were the events and circumstances which brought about the union with England. Since 1707, however, the calls for an independent Scotland have become louder with the advent of the all-party Scottish Home Rule Association in 1886, and the Scottish Nationalist Party, formed in 1934 by John MacCormack. In 1885 the government introduced the Scottish Office and the Scottish Secretary was given Cabinet rank in 1926, as a response to perceived deficiencies in dealing with Scottish affairs. Lindsay Paterson says that nationalism was about the inadequate treatment of Scottish business by the state, and not about imposed policies or oppression. Scotland gave up just so much distinctiveness as was necessary to secure the best bargain from the Union. Scotland was beginning to achieve for itself a self-managing and self-limiting civil society with a clear and observable institutional identity of its own within the UK. (Paterson, 1996, 14)
The need for new policy ideas became apparent from the 1960s onwards with the increasing popularity of the SNP, which was eating into Labour and Conservative electoral support. The SNP captured the generation entering the electorate in the 1960s and 1970s which might have voted for the Conservatives or Liberals in England. Both Labour and Conservative governments now began to look seriously at devolution proposals. Labour had been indifferent to any commitment to Home Rule for the past 20 years because of its belief in a centralised command economy as the means of achieving socialism. In 1958 the Party had formally abandoned all promises of Home Rule. What changed the Party's position was not only a Nationalist revival, but also that young modernisers in the Party like John Smith, Donald Dewar and Gordon Brown started to press for devolution as desirable in its own right. The modernisers embraced the ideas of J. P. Mackintosh, whose seminal book The Devolution of Power identified a concern at the inability of a London-based government and parliament to deal adequately with Scottish needs, and a desire for greater democratic control. (Hutchison, 2001, 129)
The Tories under Edward Heath recognised this need also and put forward devolution plans under the Declaration of Perth in 1968. But their inaction on constitutional reform during the 1970-74 Conservative government and Margaret Thatcher's total abandonment of the whole devolution issue when she became Tory leader, fostered the belief among Scottish voters that the Tory party was not interested in changing the constitution. This was one of the factors which eventually led to the Tories' electoral demise in 1997. The Labour government which followed in 1974 was much more proactive, following the recommendations of the Kilbrandon report, which the party had set up in opposition, which endorsed the case for devolution. (Hutchison, 2001, 107 & 130) In 1979 the government staged a referendum that it lost - a portent of the general election which it also lost three months later.
In the referendum in 1979, devolution was not a burning issue with the Scottish and Welsh people who were more interested in the problems of the economy. The whole country was in an economic crisis with the so-called "Winter of Discontent" due to wage constraints by the Labour government, which led to public sector workers going on strike. The Labour government became deeply unpopular. In the referendum only 4 to 1 in Wales voted in favour, whilst in Scotland only 33 per cent of people were in favour, far short of the 40 per cent required by Parliament. The newly elected Conservative government subsequently repealed the Scotland and Wales Acts. The issue of devolution was not to come to the Scottish electorate again until 1997. (Bogdanor, 1997, 289)
The Labour Party now had eighteen years in opposition to perfect its constitutional agenda, whilst the Tories enjoyed unhindered power to push through unpopular economic policies, and to force the Scottish people to endure the Poll Tax a year before England and Wales. The new Tory government in 1979, whilst not in favour of devolution, did enact some measures to partly address the call for reform. After the election the government established a Select Committee on Scottish Affairs and allowed the Scottish Grand Committee to meet in Edinburgh (it usually only met in Westminster) and limited its membership to Scottish MPs only. Other reforms included allowing the Grand Committee to debate a wider range of business and Scottish bills to have their second and third readings there. But according to the Constitution Unit these measures did nothing to stem the 'democratic deficit'. Michael Forsyth, Scottish Secretary in 1995, said that "What the people of Scotland want is Government close to them, Government listening to them, and above all Government accountable to them. This historic Parliament (Westminster) embodies our great Union. It is the only Parliament that can effectively and powerfully secure Scotland's interests and future." All these measures maintained the integrity of the Westminster Parliament at all times. (Constitution Unit, 1996, 18)
To many this was seen as "tinkering at the edges." The case for a devolved parliament was still strong. After the 1987 Conservative election victory the Campaign for a Scottish Assembly suggested a constitutional convention with the aim of drawing up a scheme for a Scottish Assembly, mobilising Scottish opinion and persuading the Government to accept the proposal. "The political arithmetic of the United Kingdom means that the Scots are constantly exposed to the risk of having matters of concern only to them prescribed by a government against which they have voted not narrowly but overwhelmingly."
The Constitution Unit concluded that: "Scotland can no longer live with the present constitution and has nothing to hope from it. Scots have shown it more tolerance than it deserves. … They have the opportunity to start the reform of the English constitution, to serve as the grit in the oyster which produces the pearl." (Constitution Unit, 1996, 19) With these lofty aims the Convention established the Scottish Constitutional Commission, which in 1994 produced detailed plans of how a future Scottish Parliament might look.
By the time of the 1997 General Election, a major plank of the Labour Party's manifesto was devoted to Constitutional reform including holding referenda on forming a Scottish and Welsh devolved parliament and assembly, directly electing a London mayor and assembly, reform of the House of Lords and a system of Proportional Representation for the European Parliamentary elections. Conservative Prime Minister John Major tried to frighten Scottish voters, claiming devolution would break up the UK, but in the event the Tories suffered one of their most humiliating defeats, losing all their MPs in Scotland. Labour could now put their proposals for a Scottish Parliament to the Scottish people who would decide in a referendum. In the campaign to win, Labour teamed up with the Liberal Democrats and the SNP, with the Tories, despite having lost so dramatically, campaigning for a No No vote. No to a Scottish Parliament, and No to it being given tax-raising powers.
The referendum posed two questions: should a Scottish Parliament come into existence, and should it have tax-raising powers? The Party's proposals were broadly similar to those worked out by the Scottish Constitutional Commission. The Labour manifesto laid out the key ideas:
"The UK is a partnership enriched by distinct and proud national identities. Proposals for devolution of power to Scotland have been part of the Labour tradition for over 100 years. Scotland has its own structure of local government and its own religious and social traditions. … It is clear that the existing system of government simply does not recognise the wish of the Scots for a greater say in their own affairs. The conviction that reform is necessary has been greatly strengthened by the widespread support for the work of the Scottish Constitutional Convention. … We have promised to legislate for devolution in Scotland and Wales in the first year. In Scotland we will create a parliament with lawmaking powers firmly based on the agreement reached in the Scottish Constitutional Convention. This will mean extending democratic control over the wide responsibilities currently exercised by the Scottish Office. … This is a reform of the structure of government in the UK, retaining the essential links between Scotland, Wales and the rest of the UK. The aim is to strengthen our system of government and to reject narrow nationalism. The Westminster Parliament remains sovereign but will pass power to the Scottish parliament and Welsh assembly as part of our drive for a wider democracy. … In Scotland we will also seek the people's approval for giving the parliament defined financial powers to vary revenue. (Labour Manifesto, 1996, 26-31)

Labour and its allies campaigned vigorously for a Yes, Yes result in the referendum held in Scotland in September 1997. This time 74.3 per cent voted to set up a Scottish Parliament, and 63.5 per cent voted in favour of the new Parliament having tax varying powers. The turnout was 60 per cent. According to Bogdanor victory for devolution was emphatic. (Bogdanor, 1997, 289) With Labour's massive majority of 179 enthusiastic MPs, progress was swift in getting the legislation onto the Statute Book. On 17 December 1997 the Scotland Act was introduced to Parliament and a little under a year later on 19 November the Act received Royal Assent leading to elections in May 1999 to the Scottish Parliament, the first since 1707.